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3Secularism and its Enemies1
The following is intended to suggest a fairly simple contention concerning 
a number of interconnected propositions made in connection with the 
debates on modernity and secularism. None of these propositions is 
particularly novel, nor is this the first time that they have been put forward. 
Yet the issues raised have remained with us and become all the more 
pressing; I can see that points that were made, against the flow, more than 
two decades ago, now stand out more cogently than ever, and are being 
revisited, rediscovered or simply discovered by many.2
The simple contention I wish to start with concerns Islamism, often 
brought out emblematically when secularism and modernity are discussed. 
Like other self-consciously retrogressive identitarian motifs, ideas, 
sensibilities, moods and inflections of politics that sustain differentialist 
culturalism and are sustained by it conceptually, Islamism has come to gain 
very considerable political and social traction over the past quarter of a 
century. This had until recently reached the extent that it, as a perceptual 
grid of social and cultural purchase relating to societies and countries that 
many associate with Islam, has become hegemonic in public discussions 
about society and politics and, until recently, hegemonic without serious 
challenge. It has also been crucial for triggering the latest round of anti-
secular discussions and polemics.3
The following discussion will proceed in three stages. First, an overall 
characterisation of anti-secular polemics and motifs in their broader 
discursive and other contexts and motifs will be offered, with special 
1 This is the revised, longer version of a paper delivered to the conference “Critique of 
Modernity”, Leipzig University, 14–15 June 2018. Parts of this text overlap with the 
author’s ‘Preface to the English Translation’ to: Aziz Al-Azmeh, Secularism in the Arab 
World: Contexts, Ideas and Consequences (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020), 
a translation of the Arabic book first published in 1992.
2 See Aijaz Ahmad, In Theory (London: Verso, 1992); Aijaz Ahmad, “Postcolonial Theory 
and the ‘Post’-Condition,” Socialist Register 33 (1997); Arif Dirlik, The Postcolonial 
Aura (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); Aziz Al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities 
(London: Verso, 2009). In a similar vein but appearing somewhat later: the historical 
lucidity and cogency of Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, 
History (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005) and the politico-conceptual 
clarity Vasant Kaiwar, The Postcolonial Orient: The Politics of Difference and the Project of 
Provincialising Europe (Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2014).
3 Andrew March, “Political Islam: Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science 18 (2015): 110.
4attention to writings characterised as post-colonialist. Next will be 
offered a discussion of some keywords that come up in this context and 
which indicate the conceptual profile in question. The essay will then 
move on to discuss two specific methods of using history in arguments 
against secularism. Finally, the essay will concentrate on post-colonialist 
discussions of Islam and secularism, exemplified in a particular case.
1 Sentiment, Pathos, Rhetoric
Islamism’s public stance was made possible rhetorically and conceptually by 
a standard global repertoire of anti-modernist motifs and concepts of late 
18th- and 19th-century vintage, motifs and concepts vigorously recovered in 
recent decades. I am concerned here specifically with the Euro-American 
academy, but the phenomenon is ubiquitous, with both the specialist and 
the demotic feeding into each other continually across a political interface. 
In a movement broadly comparable across the globe, anti-modernist 
tropes, motifs and metaphors in the Arab world migrated, under Cold War 
impulse, from social, ideological and political margins toward the centre, 
at first incrementally from around 1967, later epidemically from 1979, 
before establishing themselves pandemically as an irresistible siren song 
since 1989. These tropes have seeped into the interstices of nationalist, 
liberal and left-wing discourses and political positions, and have, with 
their culturalist and populist templates, effectively blunted political and 
analytical capacity, and come to serve as apologetic auxiliaries to an 
expanding Islamist ideological template.4
In the Euro-American context, academic as well as more broadly 
public apologetics for religious neo-conservatism and, not infrequently, for 
obscurantism, have not been the work of conservatives alone, including 
Islamists. It has also involved representatives of post-modernist and post-
colonialist currents, who generally take themselves, with no evident sense 
of incongruity or irony, to be avant-garde. What seems to go unnoticed 
is that these apologetic revendications of Islamism present mirror-images 
of current right-wing conceptions, and afterlives of more classic ones, 
4 See Al-Azmeh, “The Nationalist Era and the Future Besieged,” chap. 5, and “Conclusion: 
Secularism Today in the Context of its Adversaries,” chap. 6 in Secularism in the Arab 
World; ‘Azīz Al-Aẓma, “Bayn at-tārīkh wa’l-istikāna li’l-qadar,” Bidāyāt 14 (2016).
5both conservative and revolutionary, now reconditioned in primary 
colours, often with the strident and hectoring tonalities that have marked 
anti-modern polemics historically.5 That flirtation with the tropes of the 
hard political Right that led to untold calamities in the interwar years is 
replayed today with cavalier abandon, seems to generate little curiosity or 
to occasion any measure of self-reflection. It is this vindication of religious 
obscurantism, and specifically of identitarian obscurantism, in times often 
labelled as post-modern, that I wish to address in the following pages. 
Particular reference will be made to one variety of this apologetic discourse, 
to recent anti-secularism, with complementary but more narrowly focused 
reference to related post-colonialist claims. For illustration of post-
colonialist claims, work by and associated with one widely-cited author 
will be called upon conveniently.6 Let it be said at the outset that criticism 
here is not intended to abandon thematic perspectives opened by earlier 
post-colonialist critiques, but to question whether they have been adequate 
to the task, given their terms of reference. Nor is it intended to deliver a 
polemic, but rather to adopt a sense of the critical enterprise whose task is 
the elucidation of the general – ideological, conceptual, social and political 
– conditions of possibility of certain types of statements, much in the 
sense pioneered by Karl Marx.7 Foucauldian concern with genealogies is a 
distinct but not unrelated enterprise.
Identity politics brought in its wake the promotion and cultivation of 
a sentimentalist nativism. In the universities, this was generally correlated 
with a cognitive relativism, the latter ultimately drifting into cognitive 
nihilism associated with the consistently post-modernist and post-
colonialist currents. The resultant temper is now firmly established in 
universities and indeed in international organisations and foundations 
as well. There it has come to constitute a regnant orthodoxy, associated 
with what has rapidly become an institutionalised establishment. Like 
5 For the rhetoric of vituperation, see especially Antoine Compagnon, “Vitupération,” 
chap. 6 in Les Antimodernes: De Joseph de Maistre à Roland Barthes (Paris: Editions 
Gallimard, 2006).
6 The reference is to Talal Asad, whose views on Islam and secularism have recently been 
clearly and comprehensively sketched and respectfully put down: Hadi Enayat, Islam and 
Secularism in Post-Colonial Thought: A Cartography of Asadian Genealogies (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
7 See above all Jacques Rancière, “The Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political 
Economy,” Economy and Society 5, no. 3 (1976).
6all establishments, this fosters a conservative, rigid and often formulaic 
output, ironically in this case an output with claims to a dragon-slaying 
type of critique.
This is a type of critique that rests on an adversarial relationship to 
the best part of its objects of study. It has been especially appealing to 
latecomer niches of the academy, such as gender studies, cultural studies 
and various denominations under which identity is officiated. It petrified 
with extraordinary rapidity as it acquired institutional moorings and 
their webs of patronage and vested interest, and as it developed into an 
institutional paradigm, with the usual political economy of a regnant 
academic orthodoxy.8 This mode of output is all the more constricting 
as younger academics are trained to reiterate formulaically vocabularies 
of novelty. The shared vocabulary and poetics of post-colonialism and 
post-modernism have, in effect, become an academic sociolect which, like 
sociolects in general, has a communicative purpose defined primarily by 
the use of argotic locutions that signal mutual recognition among those 
who use this register of language. In this way, the critical stance, salutary in 
its initial purpose, was frozen in the moment of polemical inception, and 
continues to subordinate cognitive purpose to apostolic ends.
The lofty appeal often made in this context to the rhetoric of suspicion, 
with references to Ricœur and to Ricœur’s references to Descartes, would 
after consideration appear to have been contrived, and seems in the final 
analysis to be superfluous and flashy. The inquisitorial style of the rhetoric 
of suspicion is related rather to 19th-century phrenological criminology 
and the detective novel, all based on reading signs, favouring terms such 
as ‘interrogation’ and ‘interpellation’ , rather than Descartes. This forensic 
reading is generally performed in an attitude of hermeneutical hubris, 
powered by negative energy, employing a number of standard rhetorical 
devices so well brought out recently by Rita Felski.9 The reference to 
Ricœur – or Heidegger, or any of the other patristic figures used in this 
type of discourse – seems not to be one of substance primarily, but rather 
the solicitation of august authority, what classical rhetoric calls ‘ethos’.
Of especial pertinence to the present purpose, to issues of post-
colonialism’s attitude towards secularism, will be reference to the way in 
which subaltern studies veered towards neo-nativism and sentimentalism, 
8 See Michael Billig, “Towards a Critique of the Critical,” Discourse and Society 11, no. 3 (2000).
9 Rita Felski, “Suspicious Minds,” Poetics Today 32, no. 2 (2011).
7and more broadly, reference to the relationship between the political left 
and the critique of secularism. This shift in subaltern studies came with a 
decidedly anti-modern mood, once Ranajit Guha departed from the helm 
and a crop of younger, talented Indian academics at US universities came 
to decide its direction, paralleling mutations in other fields,10 and moving 
from anti-colonialism11 to post-colonialism. Post-coloniality and anti-
colonialism are very distinct politically, socially and intellectually. Post-
colonialist discourse is parasitical on anti-colonialism, to which it is related 
only rhetorically. It should be remembered that nationalist and socialist 
anti-colonialism was associated with secularism implicitly or explicitly. 
Post-colonialism is associated with anti-secularism and with apologies 
for and vindications, in the name of history, of tradition understood 
conservatively or at best apologetically, including the atavistic appeal to 
tradition.
Two consequences attend the overdetermination of this mode 
of academic practice by the adversarial mood. One is that, with few 
exceptions, the cognitive harvest has been slight, despite the persistent 
claim that vitalism, historism and nativism are closer to the ground, and that 
adversaries, especially those who might speak for modernity and secularism, 
are out of touch, and that they are too much given to abstraction. This 
position has often been associated with right-wing anti-intellectualism,12 
here paraded generally by select intellectuals as left-leaning anti-elitism. 
Works written in this spirit that have rested on empirical research tend to 
oscillate between elementary empirical description, and meta-theoretical 
imperatives: the imperatives of transposing the normative into the cognitive, 
such as advocacy for representing ‘voices’ on parity with each other rather 
than establishing facts and analytical itineraries by taking these voices for 
objects of research and distinguishing research material from the analysis 
of such material.13 Overall, the crucial mid-level, sociological or historical 
10 Perry Anderson, The H-Word: The Peripeteia of Hegemony (London: Verso, 2017), 
100–02; Sumit Sarkar, “The Decline of the Subaltern in Subaltern Studies,” in Mapping 
Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial, ed. Vinayak Chaturvedi (London: Verso, 2000).
11 Exemplarily: Eric Wolf, Europe and the People Without History (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 2010).
12 Zeev Sternhell, The Anti-Enlightenment Tradition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2010), 28–29; Judith Shklar, After Utopia: The Decline of Political Faith (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2015 [1957]), 241–44.
13 This feature is palpable in Talal Asad for instance, who will be discussed below, with 
general pronouncements based on sparse empirical material and on slight reading 
8element, is sacrificed. The perspective of subject-positions, of voice and 
meaning, intrudes in such a way as to blunt the basic distinction between 
observer and observed, scientific practitioner and her material and object 
of study.
Anti-modernism is of course a complex object of study, and has for 
over two centuries spoken in a variety of tonalities, genres, conceptual 
vocabularies and languages. It is often forgotten today, even by sociologists, 
that anti-modernism has not been primarily a matter of discourses, moods 
and motifs, of “interpretative frames” Nor has it been just a phenomenon 
that belongs fundamentally to the realm of “meaning”, whatever “meaning” 
may mean beyond the evocation of something elemental, profound and 
rather occult, in default of conveying a more concrete indication.14 
‘Meaning’ seems generally deployed to advertise a posture of knowingness 
and of privileged access to sense that defies further specification, intimating 
the inward, perhaps the ineffable. It seems best understood as a means of 
conveying pathos rhetorically. The most subtle and accomplished scholar 
using this term has needed to admit that the parsing of ‘meaning,’ or what 
might stand for it, cannot involve transforming symbols into propositions, 
for this is to risk ‘the crimes of exegesis,’ as meaning is a message deeply sunk 
in its medium, like poetry – in other words, inaccessible to propositional 
language, and lodged in images and movements which,15 in their turn, 
cannot yield anything even vaguely approximating what “meaning” may 
mean beyond pointing at symbols said to betoken it, whatever it may be 
and wherever it may reside.
Recourse to ‘meaning’ betokens anti-modernist polemic, but beyond 
the discursive and the symbolic. Anti-modernism has always been a 
social, political, and cultural dynamic, reflecting far more than an inertial 
overall, the two commensurate with what is evidently an extraordinary economy of effort 
and curiosity.
14 See the most incisive comment on the vacuity of ‘meaning’ in Heidegger in the 1928 
review of Sein und Zeit by Gilbert Ryle, reproduced in Journal of the British Society of 
Phenomenology: Gilbert Ryle, “Martin Heidegger: ‘Sein und Zeit’,” Journal of the British 
Society for Phenomenology 1, no. 3 (1970).
15 Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1980), 103. For more ample indications of the elusiveness 
of ‘meaning’ as a concept, for all Geertz’s cerebral energy and capacity for precision and 
discrimination, see Geertz, Negara, 102–05, 114 and Clifford Geertz, After the Fact: Two 
Countries, Four Decades, One Anthropologist (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1995), 115–16, 150.
9energy from the past, and has been asserted with a variety of instruments, 
including profuse bloodshed – the Iranian Revolution is a most pertinent 
case in point here: it is not only an archaising harking back, but a social 
engineering project. For post-colonialists and post-modernists, anti-
modernism – an historical social, cultural and ideological dynamic – has 
supplied nevertheless a number of patristic figures16 regarded as abstract 
instances of inspiration unsullied by the contexts of anti-modernism, 
and utilised by means of quotations which do not often have determinate 
meanings but rather convey a presumption of knowingness. These 
include Heidegger, whose tenebrous solemnities, analogies and word-
play with the German language seem to absolve him from needing to 
construct arguments. This also seems to enchant and conduct the willing 
beholder, more often than not without an adequate philosophical culture 
and vocabulary, to a political and conceptual drift, to the extent, so well 
expressed by his erstwhile pupil Karl Löwith, who said that, once one 
had heard his famous rector’s speech, one was unsure whether one 
should rush to read the pre-Socratics or join the SA.17
With Heidegger as with many patristic figures of both the historical 
Right and of the post-modern and post-colonial, pathos is proof and the 
mode of persuasion, all part of the enunciative armature of succeeding 
waves of conservative revolutions, one of which coincided with the interwar 
period of which Heidegger was a product.18 The classical rhetorical devices 
of pathos and ethos are better conducive to understanding anti-modernism 
and its associated styles than propositional content.19 Anti-modernism’s 
rhetorical medium delivery (pathos and ethos) is inseparable from the 
16 For the right-wing, irrationalist inflections in European thought in what might arguably 
be represented as mainstream, see for instance Henry Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and 
Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890–1930 (New York, NY: Knopf, 
1958); Stepan Odouev, Par les sentiers de Zarathoustra: Influence de la pensée de Nietzsche 
sur la philosophie bourgeoise allemande, translated by Catherine Emery (Moscow: 
Éditions du Progrès, 1980); Richard Wolin, The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual 
Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2004).
17 Karl Löwith, “The Political Implications of Heidegger’s Existentialism,” in The Heidegger 
Controversy: A Critical Reader, ed. Richard Wolin (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 176.
18 See Pierre Bourdieu, The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1991); Richard Wolin, Heidegger’s Children: Hanna Arendt, Karl Löwith, 
Hans Jonas and Herbert Marcuse (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
19 See Richard Shorten, “Reactionary rhetoric reconsidered,” Journal of Political Ideologies 
20, no. 2 (2015): 184–85.
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message, as in poetry. The emphasis in this rhetoric is on the resonance of 
terms such as authenticity and meaning, on the stress on some ontological 
order over history, on irrationalist engagement with sentiment over reason
The prefix “post” to the phenomena under discussion is itself one which 
carries over the pathos of anti-modern sensibilities into what presents itself 
as beyond the time of the past as well as of the present. Impenetrability and 
intimations of the subterranean and of occult wisdom are consequently not 
incidental but rather crucial to evocations of Heidegger.
Access to the occult is equally relevant to other patristic figures of this 
tendency, whose roster includes the laconic Wittgenstein, whose aphoristic 
terseness and provincial sageliness, conjoined with personal idiosyncracy, 
are taken for evidence of signs, wonders and oracles – but who also speaks 
in sinister biologising metaphors of life-worlds, so common among right-
wing ideologues: a concept arising, like its ethno-geographical companion 
Lebensraum and the associated Weltanschauung, from deterministic 19th-
century German social geography and ethnology. Others include Gadamer’s 
appendices to Heidegger. In France Emmanuel Levinas, something of a 
latecomer to this supra-national status,20 whose recourse to the language 
of resonant but indeterminant abstractions of identity and ancestralism is 
ubiquitous, and much favoured. Among other things, Levinas objected to 
– in one instance, Sartre – “mistaking” Judaism’s historical being for its 
“metaphysical essence”, and wished to liberate Jews from Enlightenment 
ideas of emancipation, to free them of Descartes and Spinoza, and reinstate 
the idea, suitably reconditioned and given a positive valency, of the eternal 
Jew21 – which had always been grist to the mill of anti-Semitism, as Sartre 
indicated. One need of course mention the somewhat incomprehensible 
elevation of Carl Schmitt to this patristic conventicle, and of course Michel 
Foucault, after the latter’s transit in California which marked his move 
from rigorous cognitive preoccupations to a more self-indulgent agenda. 
All these figures are made by many casuistical means to yield a cursory and 
20 This status was not achieved by the somewhat older Henri Bergson, so important to 
French thinkers who came to appreciate the irrational, including Levinas, Halbwachs, 
Deleuze and Teilhard de Chardin. He was implicated with occultism and revivalist 
Catholicism, and was in his own time been regarded to represent the contrary of secular 
and scientific attitudes of the Republic: see Robert C. Grogin, The Bergsonian Controversy 
in France, 1900–1914 (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1988).
21 Samuel Moyn, Origins of the Other: Emmanuel Levinas between Revelation and Ethics 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 207–11.
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flat conceptual template for what Eco termed a “neo-Cartesianism of the 
irrational”, all the more so as these authors are usually approached by those 
drawn to them from the post-colonialist and post-modernist milieu in a 
condition of eager and impressionable philosophical innocence.
2 Moods and Keywords
As this discussion moves into the medias res, my initial position is that 
post-colonialist and post-modernist directions in the social and human 
sciences can be characterised by a number of features, none of which is 
novel or post-anything really. A primary feature is a vitalist and organismic 
concept of society, a conception of society expressed in terms of biological 
metaphors, of homeopathy, organic integrity versus infection, disnaturation 
and distemper, of autonomy and heteronomy, of roots and parasites and so 
forth.22 In its earliest, counter-Enlightenment moment, this vitalist concept 
of society deployed organism against the mechanism of modern science, 
a trope that persisted in early anti-capitalist romanticism, practically 
expressed in the Luddite destruction of textile machinery in England in 
the 19th century, machinery subversive of natural and organic forms of 
production.
This is complemented by a constructivist epistemology premised on 
relativism, counterposed to scientism, a kind of cognitive Luddism where 
knowledge comes to be taken for a form of collective instinct expressed 
in what are commonly called voices or meanings, and where propositions 
and discourses are taken for unmediated and direct redactions of nativist 
sentiment, autonomous of exogenous and heteronomous categories or 
concepts. This, by necessity, results in a relativistic concept of knowledge, at 
the limit, in cognitive nihilism. Knowledge is taken here for an expression 
of social instinct, rendered in terms such as incommensurability, or as 
Verstehen opposed to conceptualisation, not uncommonly conjoined 
with knowing declamations on knowledge and power. All the while, this 
constructivist position is overdetermined by the terms of a polemic against 
positivists and other assorted miscreants, whose positions are generally and 
22 See Judith Schlanger, Les métaphores de l´organisme (Paris: Vrin, 1971); Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde, “Organ,” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, vol. 4, ed. Otto Brunner, Werner 
Conze, and Reinhart Kosellek (Stuttgart: Klett-Kotta, 2004), §§ VIII.2–5, IX.1–2.
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in heresiological manner reduced to clichés and schematic representations 
with little correspondence to actual positions or practices:23 such, after all, 
are the methods of polemic, which works with parody.
The other primary feature is a deterministic, historist conception 
of history.24 This is a conception of history as the parallel itineraries, 
in time, of generically different stocks, each with predetermined and 
abiding characteristics; extraneous intrusions such as colonialism 
cause derangements of essence, but these are taken for temporary 
contaminations, the system coming ultimately to restore its original 
balance homoeopathically and inevitably: hence terms such as Revival, 
Risorgimento and their cognates. Altogether, a move is made decisively 
from what was once taken to be the naturalness of reason, to the naturalness 
of desire, need, locality and of prejudice, which was famously celebrated by 
Gadamer – Eco’s Cartesianism of the irrational.25 Altogether, we have here 
a clear instance romanticism in the theories of history and society, which 
aestheticises political ideas and institutions. History and society become 
aestheticized; they become sublime, and politics itself becomes a matter for 
subjective non-political emotional response.
Such, in fact and in brief, are the strong conceptual and categorical 
modules by which the differentialist politics of identity is transposed into 
the academic field. One sees the desiderata of scientific research expressed 
in terms such as fact, reality and objectivity, together with historicist 
notions such as progress and the Enlightenment, consigned to a status 
so lowly as to need insistently the stigma of inverted commas. Inverted 
commas thus used convey knowing incredulity and disparagement by 
a move of elementary irony conveyed to a reading crowd of a shared 
23 See, exemplarily still, the early discussion of constructivist sociology of science by Larry 
Laudan, “The Pseudo-Science of Science,” Philosophy of Social Science 11 (1981).
24 One of the clearest statements of the entire doctrine is Gadamer’s lecture at the German 
Institute in occupied Paris in 1941: Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Herder et ses théories sur 
l’Histoire,” in Regards sur l’histoire: Cahiers de l’Institut Allemand, ed. Karl Epting (Paris: 
Sorlot, 1941). A very good synoptic characterisation of historism is by Georg Iggers, 
“Historicism: The History and Meaning of the Term,” Journal of the History of Ideas 56, 
no. 1 (1995): 135–36; see also Sternhell, Anti-Enlightenment Tradition, 19–24.
25 ‘Azīz Al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities (Londo: Verso, 2009), 19–20.
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sociolect.26 Nevertheless, despite the insistent disparagement of empiricism, 
post-colonialist and post-modernist scholarship has generally not been 
averse to the idea that the criticism of modernity and secularisation 
is sustained empirically from the evidence of contemporary religious 
movements. Reference is often made to movements that belie ostensibly the 
claims of secularism, above all Islamism and Pentecostalism. In the general 
historiographic scheme, and post-colonial as well as post-modernist 
scholarship rest on robust and consistent if often implicit conceptual 
assumptions, these are taken for a revival and a return of the suppressed, 
a restoration of natural homeopathic balance, speaking truth to a lie. With 
Casanova, for instance, no post-colonialist but in the flow of a congruent 
anti-secular polemic emerging from overall congruent circumstances, 
evoking Pentecostalism or Islamism involves no mere change of perspective, 
but is fully a corrective perceptual shift commensurate with an abiding 
reality of the public salience of religion.27 This is in keeping with historist 
– as distinct from historicist – assumptions of abiding morphological 
elements in any given collectivity – Herder’s Kräfte, national spirit, national 
character, culture, civilisation, traditions, values, life-forms and so forth. 
With these trans-historical elements in play, the passage of history amounts 
to so many conjunctural bumps that leave the underlying essence whole. 
Neither conjuncture nor future, in this register, are history; they are rather 
redactions of ethnological destiny. Secularisation and modernisation, not 
to speak of secularism and modernism, are in effect pronounced illusory 
because they do not form part of the narrative of destiny.
Before we continue, a clarification of perspective is in order. The 
empirical evidence used by anti-secular polemics cannot be taken simply 
as a return of religion, or the restoration of an original condition, as would 
be required by anti-modernist ideological modules. What needs to be 
apprehended is that societal recourse to religion is a polemical resource, 
congruent with a significant reconfiguration of the religious field, globally 
and over the lifetime of the past generation. This is not a return, nor a 
26 Not unlike the Lingua Tertii Imperii, there is here a re-enactment of an oratorical occasion 
where the inverted comma is expressed by a digital gesture, with the inverted commas 
conveying a change of tone: Victor Klemperer, “Punctuation,” chap. 12 in The Language 
of the Third Reich: LTI – Lingua Tertii Imperii: A Philologist’s Notebook, translated by 
Martin Brady (London: Continuum Books, 2000).
27 José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1994), 11.
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resurrection, for religion never disappeared, but a recasting, because of 
history and not in spite of history. Recall of history here is not an appeal 
to supposedly enchanted depths imagined to be captive to permanences 
that historism would wish to see, to what some call, imprecisely and 
inappropriately, path dependency. History refers rather to conjunctural 
transformations in the past quarter of a century. If one insisted on the 
mystical vocabularies of inwardness and abidance championed in post-
colonialist discourses, transfiguration would serve better than resurrection. 
Religion was never absent, and never inactive, and it is worth noting the 
point made by Casanova, quite correctly, that the thesis of the absence or 
waning of religion has no necessary analytical connection to the standard 
secularisation thesis,28 despite claims to the contrary by anti-secular 
polemics.
Empirical inaptitude is also the case with another feature continuously 
ascribed to the secularisation thesis by its critics, that it is teleological. 
With some exceptions of hard teleology, including Auguste Comte and 
ideological statements of secularism, predestinarian teleology does not 
figure in the secularisation thesis and, when it does occur, it does so as 
a hope, not as a constitutive conceptual feature of the thesis. Even when 
historicist conclusions of the inevitable waning of religion are drawn when 
interpreting patterns and forms of change over time, and when trends 
are discerned, including secularisation and functional differentiation 
correlated with modernity, there is no structural implication of a telos. 
Correlatively, what is commonly seen as the return to prominence of 
religion, with spectacular and sanguine force since the end of the Cold 
War,29 has had a cyclical history connecting its various moments in 
complex ways,30 and is in phase with developments beyond the world of 
the mind, to which discussions of secularism rarely attend. The renewed 
significance of religion is in this respect part of a global anti-modernist, 
anti-Enlightenment counter-revolution repeating previous performances. 
These had involved nationalism, relativism, anti-rationalism, and have 
28 José Casanova, “Reply to Talal Asad,” in Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and his 
Interlocutors, ed. Charles Hirschkind and David Scott (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2006), 16.
29 See Al-Azmeh, “The Discourse of Cultural Authenticity: Islamist Revivalism and 
Enlightenment Universalism,” chap. 2 in Islams and Modernities; Aziz Al-Azmeh, 
“Civilisation as a Political Disposition,” Economy and Society 41, no. 4 (2012).
30 Shorten, “Reactionary rhetoric,” 188–96.
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been accompanied by brooding meditations on decadence, degeneration, 
and the twilight of nations and communities, together with a cult of the 
popular soul.
The present phase of globalisation is the last in a series to date. The 
first run of this constellation of topoi and sentiments crystallised following 
the collapse of an old world in 1789 (leading lights: Herder, de Maistre, 
Burke). The second followed 1848 and 1870 (leading lights: Gobineau, 
Carlyle, Savigny, von Stein, Le Bon, Pope Pius IX’s Syllabus of Errors of 
1864) with the second eruption of ‘the people’. Such moods continued in 
various forms to shape the malaise of the fin-de-siècle, consolidated in the 
third phase following 1917 and 1918, feeding upon fear of and disgust with 
the proletariat. It crystallised ultimately in various forms of fascism (some 
leading lights: Maurras, Spengler, Schmitt, Heidegger, Hasan al-Banna, 
Golwalkar, and of course Mussolini, Hitler and Rosenberg).
The fourth, following 1989 but with elements in place before, is 
characterised by identity politics and its various corollaries, such as 
the polemics against modernity and Enlightenment. These have been 
correlative to the recession of programmes of progress and development, 
and also the loss not only of socialism, but also of Keynesianism and other 
programmes of social solidarity and prophylaxis against socio-political 
disaggregation. This phase built upon the ideological mobilisation of 
religion during the Cold War (especially in and by Saudi Arabia, in Poland, 
in Italy, in the East Indies), and later followed up on the consequences of 
the Iranian Revolution of 1979. It also built upon a right-wing liberalism 
nurtured by the anti-Communism of the Cold War, then represented by 
persons such as Isaiah Berlin, and upon an impasse in political thinking, 
accompanied later, however briefly, by triumphalist declamations of 
the end of history. It also mobilised revisionist historiographies of all 
movements that had previously been considered to have held historical 
promise, such as the French Revolution, and by a Wilsonian perspective in 
which a liberal conception of freedom foreclosed the necessity of a political 
theory of freedom.31
As suggested, the older romantic conceptions of history and society 
were ones that had marked the right in Western Europe from the time of 
31 See ‘Abdallāh Al-‘Arwī, Mafhūm al-Ḥurrīya, (Casablanca: Al-Markaz al-Thaqāfi al-‘Arabī, 
2008), 71, 90. This had been noted relatively early in the Cold War, before hindsight 
became a guide: Shklar, After Utopia, 235–39.
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the French Revolution. These had appeared later among Slavophils and 
other laggard nationalisms, including in Japan (where Heidegger had a 
conspicuous presence, and still does), in India, and South-East Asia and the 
Middle East from the late 19th century. These crystallised more integrally 
in the interwar period in movements such as fascism in the variety of its 
forms, the Muslim Brothers and the Indian Rashtria Swayamsevak Sangh 
and radical strands of Romantic Arab, Turkish and Iranian nationalism.32 
One crucial difference between political Romanticism in its first post-1789 
phase, and in the present one, is according to Shklar that in the earlier one, 
the defeat of Zeus betokened the triumph of Prometheus, of hope, while 
from the middle of the 20th century, the death of God meant the defeat of 
man as well.33
The overarching topos for the pattern of global cycles just outlined in its 
present phase is culture, with culturalism being the meta-social and meta-
historical template that has been adopted as the carrier of anti-modernism.34 
It would be pertinent to sketch briefly the elements that shaped today’s 
culturalism, in which the concept of culture has come to play the role that 
race had played previously in the analysis and social and political treatment 
of collectivities. Culturalism is, contrary to what its polemics might imply, 
very strongly foundationalist, and stands on a grand romantic narrative of 
the singular, the subject, the self-identical substance, the pre-colonial and 
pre-modern, the prelapsarian, with stoutly held conceptual assumptions. 
It assumes that society is characterised by homogeneity and homeopathy 
of essence; and that the passage of time is best described in terms of 
abidance and continuity, which in fact extrude from history that which is 
historical.35 At the close of the 20th century, these modules had become the 
common sense of the post Cold-War era, listlessly taken for self-evident, 
well-worn, familiar, predictable, formulaic and effortlessly repeatable. The 
broader phenomenon is ideological. When theorised, it has been inspired 
32 Further traction to this point that I argued over two decades ago in Islams and Modernities 
has been added in recent work: Georges Corm, Pour une lecture profane des conflits: Sur 
le retour du religieux dans les conflits du Moyen-Orient (Paris: La Découverte, 2015), 
51–57; Sternhell, Anti-Enlightenment Tradition, 14–17; for right-liberal Cold War anti-
Enlightenment declamations see Sternhell, “The Anti-Enlightenment of the Cold War,” 
chap. 8 in Anti-Enlightenment Tradition.
33 See Shklar, After Utopia, 111, 114–20.
34 Al-Azmeh, “Islamism and the Arabs,” chap. 1 in Islams and Modernities.
35 Al-Azmeh, 25–26, 30–31.
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by echoes of Herder and Fichte, by Treitschke, Gobineau and Maurras, its 
broader and to us more proximate elaborations owe much to Nietzsche and 
Klages. The impact that this very broad movement of moods, modules and 
motifs has had on one mainspring of postism in its present form, Critical 
Theory, has gone unnoticed generally.
This is particularly the case with the variant of irrationalism represented 
by the Frankfurt School’s aversion to the Enlightenment, complemented 
by Benjamin’s partiality to mystical concepts and vocabularies, much of it 
inspired by the then strongly felt but not readily perceptible penumbra of 
Klages’ Magical Philosophy and Stefan George’s Denkbilder. The impact of 
both has been underestimated, or indeed gone unnoticed, not least as there 
seems to have been an anthropological congruence between irrationalist 
Lebensphilosophie associated with Klages, and that implicit in the Dialectic of 
the Enlightenment’s critique of the Enlightenment. The same congruence is 
pertinent to Benjamin’s positions, far nearer to Nietzsche than to Marxism; 
Benjamin’s flirtation with the latter has been vastly overinterpreted. He 
had, after all, “transformed the counter-Enlightenment critique worked 
out by magicians into the proper business of a philosopher”.36
Alongside this, much of the present moment of post-modernism and 
post-colonialism is owed directly to American cultural anthropology, 
which has been important for the shaping of culturalism. This is a cultural 
anthropology decisively inseminated by Franz Boas, directly and through 
Ruth Benedict’s allegedly stable ethnological “patterns” that are said to 
characterise societies fully, and according to a stable morphology, as 
well as through Margaret Mead, the latter’s student and colleague. This 
conceptual fare consisted of 19th-century German Romantic nationalist 
Völkerpsychologie and Völkerkunde, the Brothers Grimm, folklore studies 
and ideas of nativism against civilisation. All the while, the ethnographer, 
36 Jason Josephson-Storm, “Dialectic of Darkness: The Magical Foundations of Critical 
Theory,” chap. 8 in The Myth of Disenchantment: Magic, Modernity and the Birth of the 
Human Sciences (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2017), 236, 238. See Axel 
Honneth, “Anthropologische Berührungspunkte zwischen der lebensphilosophischen 
Kulturkritik und ‘Der Dialektik der Aufklärung’,“ in 21. Deutscher Soziologentag 1982: 
Beiträge der Sektions- und ad hoc Gruppen, ed. Friedrich Heckmann and Peter Winter 
(Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1983), 786–89; Georg Stauth and Bryan S. Turner, 
“Ludwig Klages (1872–1956) and the Origins of Critical Theory,” Theory, Culture and 
Society 9, no. 3 (1992): 45. For American versions of ‘continental philosophy’ in this respect, 
see Jonathan Sheehan, “Enlightenment, Religion and the Enigma of Secularization: A 
Review Essay,” The American Historical Review 108, no. 4 (2003): 1065–66.
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often acting as the natives’ tribune, received dutifully from native 
informants what the latter thought she might like to hear.37
All of these anti-modernist, culturalist and nativist directions of thought 
concur that there is an esoteric, perhaps even occult core, that is lost to 
modernity, and that this is revived when trans-historical essences return 
– recall what has been said above about the term ‘meaning’. The corollary 
has often been, since Herder, that there are prelapsarian uncorrupted 
conditions which the time of modernity had soiled. Anti-modernists seek 
to evoke the concept of meaning, which figures as a social version of the 
innate ideas concept, of a knowledge bounded by life and indistinct from 
life, being life’s poetry to modernity’s prose, a condition of authenticity, a 
culture of Volksgeist, a psychologistic metaphor taken for a fact.38
Ostensible meaning and the various topoi and figures that stand for it are 
the equivalent of what in the first, romantic phase of anti-modernism was 
known as the sublime, das Erhabene, which Edmund Burke saw as a figure 
of dread that lay at the heart of all religion, but which is not confined to 
this particular semantic field, but is shared with other definitions that make 
recourse to affections and romantic sensibilities and aesthetise society and 
history. And indeed, in any generic characterisation of anti-modernism as 
that most perceptive one offered by Compagnon,39 the sublime represents 
the aesthetic figure, alongside other component figures and topoi of anti-
modernist discourses that this author identifies most usefully. Of these I 
would mention the historical figure, which I would prefer to designate as 
the political figure of counter-revolution (the post-1989 instantations are 
revenant political religion and forms of fascism). Equally important is the 
philosophical figure of anti-Enlightenment, which I would call culturalism, 
comprehending both historism and vitalism. The moral or existential figure, 
which I would designate as the sentimentalist figure of pessimism, to which 
I would add historical nostalgia. The religious figure indicates an idea 
of of original sin, which I would reformulate as a fall from a prelapsarian 
condition, now identified as a pre-colonial and pre-modern state of grace. 
37 See especially Tessel Pollmann, “Margaret Mead’s Balinese: The Fitting Symbols of the 
American Dream,” Indonesia 49 (1990); Derek Freeman, Margaret Mead and the Heretic: 
The Making and Unmaking of an Anthropological Myth (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1996); Adam Kuper, “The Boasians and the critique of evolutionism,” chap. 7 in The 
Invention of Primitive Society: Transformations of an Illusion (London: Routledge, 1988).
38 Al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities, 28–31.
39 Compagnon, Les Antimodernes, 17.
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Finally, there is a stylistic figure of tone, voice and accent, with an stress on 
imprecation and vituperation, and ultimately with dependence on the use of 
ethos and pathos articulated by tonality, as we have seen.
In all this, historism is a major player, and Heidegger might well be 
brought up as an exemplary topos and a flag to wave. It is difficult to 
identify conceptual as distinct from tonal influence from Heidegger, 
conveyed by fascination with the name. Mystification by both sender and 
receiver is a crucial feature here, and obscurity is not a technical flaw 
liable to correction by proper exegesis. To be under Heidegger’s influence 
is to be ensnared by the possibilities afforded by his example for dropping 
the discipline of thought and surrendering to the play of pathos using 
analogies, sentiments, metaphors and associations. It is these drifts of 
an almost erotic fascination, often allied to contempt for democracy, 
that drew high-grade intellectuals with Olympian aspirations to various 
manifestations of fascism or romantic conservatism – one might mention 
the Eranos Group, including Henri Corbin, or various members of the 
Collège de Sociologie, including Bataille and Caillois.40 Indeed, there was 
much hype about the hyper-modernism – aesthetic no less than political – 
of fascism and national socialism that had a very strong appeal to the 
intellectuals.41
This fascination with the pathos of resonant meaninglessness is not 
confined to Europe; the anti-modernism of the Iranian Ahmad Fardid, 
and the concept of Westoxification or Occidentosis, was officiated under 
a Heideggerian signature.42 Note that Heidegger has had hardly any 
resonance in Arabic thinking that has been of a similar nativist cast, using 
a congruent vocabulary to that of Fardid:43 this fact gives sustenance to the 
40 Steven M. Wasserstrom, Religion after Religion: Gershom Scholem, Mircea Eliade, and 
Henri Corbin at Eranos (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Stephan 
Moebius, Die Zauberlehrlinge: Sozialgeschichte des Collège de Sociologie (1937–1939) 
(Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006); Frank Pearce, ed., “The Collège de 
Sociologie,” special issue, Economy and Society 32, no. 1 (2003).
41 See, in general, Roger Griffin, Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under 
Mussolini and Hitler (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
42 Ali Mirsepassi, Transnationalism in Iranian Political Thought: The Life and Times of 
Ahmad Fardid (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
43 On which: Mouchir Basile Aoun, Heidegger et la pensée arabe (Paris: L’Harmattan, 
2011). More important in the Arab World among some nationalists (including the 
Baath), and fulfilling a similar role of creating mystification and pathos, was Bergson, 
conveying an appreciation of instinct (here: national instinct) as opposed to reason, the 
spirit as opposed to mere matter, duration as opposed to change as opposed to reason, 
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view proposed here, that it is more the tonal aura of transfixed fascination, 
and rhetorical topoi, that are at play in the connection with Heidegger, 
rather than any conceptual goods. There is here little that is distinctively 
Heideggerian in conceptual terms as distinct from what is generically 
irrationalist, romantic and historist.
Today, this fascination with Heidegger, as with other patristic figures of 
post-modernism, signals a certain tribal affiliation in the academic world. 
In rhetorical terms, it manifests ethos, tokens of authority and emblems of 
commonality, an irresistible fascination binding a group to an aura expressed, 
as best as possible, in a sociolect. Heidegger’s ‘alienation’ is well suited to 
a hermeneutic of suspicion where there is also an assumption of durable 
substance that might be reclaimed and saved. Like aesthicising romanticism 
overall, Heidegger operates by hypostatising specific historical conditions 
of human existence into ontological and metaphysical conditions,44 and by 
collapsing the distinction between cognition and being, as in the Heideggerian 
notion of meaning. It is eminently serviceable to musings about loss and 
destiny,45 which can only be engaged effectively by a political decisionism, 
where the Dasein moves and creates its enemy in its own self-affirmation and 
the manifestation of will, in the manner of Carl Schmitt. This is accomplished 
not by universal reason or the faculty of the understanding, but by knowing 
resolve, wissende Entschlossenheit.46 My reference to Heidegger in these terms is 
very much in the spirit of what Kant had to say about Herder: that he had spun 
a fabric of bold metaphors, poetic images and mythological allusions that serve 
to obscure, wondering whether “the poetic spirit which enlivens the author’s 
expression has not also at times done violence to his philosophy; whether 
synonyms on occasion act as substitutes for explanations, and allegories for 
truths”.47 Whether one considers Heidegger’s manner of expression to be 
inspiring is a matter of taste.
and deploying a variety of poetical trope which absolve him of the necessity to offer 
arguments: see the ironical exposition of Bertrand Russell, “The philosophy of Bergson,” 
The Monist 22, no. 3 (1912): 323–27, 332–33.
44 Herbert Marcuse, “Existentialism: Remarks on Jean Paul Sartre’s L’Être et le Néant,” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8, no. 3 (1948): 311.
45 Hans Blumenberg, “Progress Exposed as Fate,” pt. 1, chap. 3, “Political Theology I and 
II,” pt. 1, chap. 8, “The Rhetoric of Secularizations,” pt. 1, chap. 9 in The Legitimacy of the 
Modern Age (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985).
46 Karl Löwith, “The Political Implications of Heidegger’s Existentialism,” 177.
47 Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 215–16.
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3 Actually Existing Secularism and the Challenge of Fate
There has been a gentler way with decisionism and wissende Entschlossenheit 
in academic work which decided to transpose what it sees as moral or 
political imperatives into cognitive ones, and thus to privilege the notion 
of identity understood in terms of culturalist differentialism as a category 
of analysis. So also the notion of voice, whose very alleged irreducibility 
makes it definitive and irrefutable. The sociological redactions of destiny 
that we find in work on anti-secularism and Islamism are of this type, 
their anti-secular polemics officiated under assumptions of the essential 
impossibility and illusory character of secularism. Nevertheless, works by 
sociologists of different stripes pertinent to the context of this discussion, 
are ones to which sociology is the least of inputs. In these discussions of 
secularism, meta-sociological categories are in the ascendant, as different 
variations on “culture”, arising from organismic and vitalist historism, to 
which the idea of the irreducible individuality of cultures and peoples is 
central. Islamism and secularism appear here as a mutually determinant 
contrastive pair.
It is now time briefly to offer a general characterisation of the sociological 
redaction of destiny upon which anti-secular polemics rest. This redaction 
is in fact the outcrop of a doctrine that has a specific name and a global 
history, as suggested already. It is called historist vitalism: the idea that 
societies are held together by trans-historical dispositions (such as tradition 
or national spirit, Islam or Christianity, all grossly defined) which, despite 
historical change, always come to constitute an abiding initial condition 
which trumps change and renders it inconsequential except in so far as it 
causes derangement, and is ultimately reasserted. The historist discourse 
here operates with biologistic metaphors. It involves, typically, topics of 
decline, often conflated with change overall, and regarded as estrangement 
of essence, disnaturation (a word often used by Shakespeare), Entartung, 
de-specification, quite common from the 19th century in psychiatry, 
criminology and social criticism. Both words had been used commonly 
for deviance, disease and monstrosity, exemplarily so by Max Nordau, the 
second president of the World Zionist Congress who took great exception 
to decadent art and letters (Baudelaire, Wagner and many others), and by 
Josef Goebbels, who did likewise, more famously. The concordances may 
not be political, but they are conceptual, shared by the classic Right and 
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today’s identitarian reclamations of whatever political orientation. In all 
cases, the result of such diremptions of essence will be inevitably, according 
to this perspective, a grotesque, what Spengler termed a Pseudomorph. 
Note that the vocabulary expressing biologistic metaphors is metaphysical, 
and more specifically Neo-Platonic, one of substance, plenitude of being, 
privation of being.
Homeostatically-conceived human collectivities might rebalance 
natural and constitutive tempers and humours, generally called roots or 
traditions or heritages or indeed values, or in different types of discourse, 
culture or civilisation.48 These are not subject to transformation in 
real ways. Change is always externally induced, and takes the form of 
adulteration, soiling and indeed, defilement. It is a derangement of proper 
order which causes diminishing vitality, the effects of heteronomous forces 
– like those brought about by modernity or secularisation upon societies 
often called Islamic. One might well note the tonal colours of all these and 
related terms, and the way in which organismic metaphors lend themselves 
to pathetic sonority. This condition pathology (modernity, secularism) is 
treatable homoeopathically, with the restoration of tradition, by returning 
to roots, carried by nostalgia and identitarian reaffirmation. Thus, the idea 
that Arab societies, being in essence on this reading Islamic societies rather 
than societies that contain Muslims, need inevitably to return to an initial 
condition of purity, following confrontations, challenges and periods of 
contamination by extraneous agents that had acted as debilitating and 
disnaturing conditions in the body politic and the body social, but did not 
metastasise uncontrollably or sully the fastness of origins. Such exogenous 
agents can be specified as colonialism and secularising elites for the 
purposes of this discussion.
A brief digression can identify elements that are obscured in this 
culturalism. First, in any given social unit, and all the more so in larger 
and more complex ones, traditions and social practices are plural. They 
are arranged in a system of internal differentiation and distribution, and 
enter into relations domination and hierarchy. Moreover, judgements 
upon the analytical utility of culture is dependent on the precise object of 
analysis, not least when culture is taken for a causative element – the idea 
that culture is an overarching causal and structural element in any given 
48 Aziz Al-Azmeh, “Typological Time, Patterning and the Past Appropriated,” chap. 2 in 
The Times of History (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007).
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large-scale social unit is vacuous. Tradition and the appeal to tradition 
under the aspect of culture is rather, as in atavism and primitivism, more a 
politico-discursive resource for those who invoke it, than an active entity, 
and when an entity, it can be made into an object of anthropological study 
in so far as it is a hypothesis put forward to account for observed repetition 
in social practices and representations (rather than, as with Edward Shils, 
itself to be this repetition).49 In contrast to culturalist claims, and with 
particular reference to the relationship between the sociological and meta-
sociological, Clifford Geertz, often referred to as a patriarch of culturalism, 
was far from being a cultural determinist. Unlike many post-colonial 
anthropologists averse to analysing their objects of study, he always 
remained an anthropologists’ anthropologist, producing ethnographic 
work of the highest possible order in which culture has a place, but within 
a broader system of relations. This impelled him to consider very seriously 
the analytical value and operationalist use of the notion of culture: with 
reference to Bali, he highlighted “the tendency for the divisive effect of 
social institutions to predominate over the unifying power of cultural 
ones”, and affirmed that “few political elites can have as intensely sought 
loyalty by means so ingeniously designed to produce treachery as did the 
Balinese”.50
The sociological redaction of destiny, the destiny of human collectivities 
conceived by means of vitalist, biologistic metaphors, would have things 
otherwise. Arab societies, and Iranian society as well, being, in this register, 
congenitally predisposed to an ethnological destiny expressed in what is 
generally known as Islamic culture or Islamic civilisation, are captive to a 
cultural incapacity for change of real consequence. Post-colonial and post-
modernist discourses describe this in terms of resistance and authenticity. 
The changes undergone by these societies over more than a century had 
been heteronomous, it is claimed, and in the final analysis a charade. 
Abidance of essence is captive to the parameters of origin, of the initial 
49 As in conservative discourse generally, classically expressed by Edward Shils, “Tradition,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 13, no. 2 (1971). Also see Al-Azmeh, Islams 
and Modernities, 32–34; Pascal Boyer, Tradition as Truth and Communication (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 2–4, 32–37, 79–86; Marc Augé, Le sens des autres (Paris: 
Fayard, 1994), 28–29; Adam Kuper, “Culture, Difference, Identity,” chap. 7 in Culture: The 
Anthropologists’ Account (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
50 Geertz, Negara, 45.
24
condition.51 We have here a notion of culture as a prison of social instinct 
rather than as a field of human action, including individual and societal 
improvement, culture being regarded as a thing rather than a property,52 
overdetermining society and trumping history. Vitalist culturalism is a 
crude form of social Darwinism in that it regards social collectivities as 
analogous to animal species. Culturalism, like racism and ethnocentrism, 
is a sublimated redaction of political communalism which, like other 
communalisms, operates by the indication of emblems and stigmata that 
ensure the maintenance and reiteration of boundaries. Islamist vitalism 
becomes recognisable in a global setting where identity is being taken for 
common sense.
All culturalist historism today invokes native voice. It proffers a 
programme of what Taylor called, famously, politely and distantly, a politics 
of recognition. This is a politics which is redacted at the points of concrete 
application on the ground, in actual fact, a politics of bluster and special 
pleading, generally unmannerly to the degree that must surely challenge 
Taylor’s advocacy of and capacity for recognition. Taylor’s is a communalist 
template premised on the self-enclosure of human collectivities, and 
their cultivation of origins as expressed in ostensible traditions that yield 
particularistic values, ethics and politics. Culture comes to be regarded as 
irreducible and sui generis, an independent variable, and therefore beyond 
the reach of sociological and historical analysis. Often counterposed to 
that which is taken for a teleology of the Enlightenment, this is a reverse 
teleology which works backwards, paradoxically but unsurprisingly, as the 
future can be no other than the past in its perpetual initial condition.
Among other things, this perspective of generically distinct voices yields 
pluralisation and multiplication, seemingly without end. If underdeveloped 
countries, including those identified as Islamic, cannot in this perspective 
really be said to have modernised or secularised except inadequately or 
bizarrely, or to be incapable congenitally of this type of improvement, they 
can nevertheless be included politely in the conversation and be said to 
have modernised or secularised multiply, each according to their own 
way, all seemingly innocent and straightforward, and quite ingenuous 
51 Well described by Sudipta Kaviraj, “Outline of a Revisionist Theory of Modernity,” 
European Journal of Sociology 46, no. 3 (2005).
52 Nicolas Claidière and Dan Sperber, “Defining and explaining culture (comments on 
Richerson and Boyd, Not by genes alone),” Biology and Philosophy 23, no. 2 (2008): 291–92.
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conceptually, in fact. I have personally used the term Islams, and this has 
often been misread, stripped of implied irony, and placed in the flow of 
reclamations of voice and the cognitive Saturnalia of difference and so 
forth. Yet this usage had in fact sought to reinstate and encourage a critical, 
properly historical analysis of the themes treated, not to dissolve a category 
– here, Islam – into senseless plurality, nor to dissolve the categories of 
Islam and of modernity into skittish revelry, or to announce a solemn 
redemption of authenticity.53 My Islams and Modernities was intended, in 
contrast, to reaffirm the purely nominal character of the category “Islam”, 
and to argue against its use as a classificatory category or an analytical or 
causal concept.
What was most explicitly and clearly intended was not the effacement 
of general analytical concepts, but the reinstatement of history against 
culturalist claims for abidance. Multiplying ‘secularities’ (more on this 
term below) or modernities, and other targets of this rhetoric of categorical 
deflation, cannot free historical reality from secularism and modernity.54 
Such multiplications are motivated, one presumes, by the empirical 
complexity of social transformations. But situationally and contextually, 
in the final analysis, they seem impelled more by culturalist agendas 
inimical to secularism, for the accent is placed on representations rather 
than processes. Thus seeking complexity by telescoping secularisation in 
“the longue durée of civilizational history”, thinking of secularism in terms 
of “cultural diversity”, appealing to “spiritual ontologies” and searching 
for “cultural meanings”, and claiming that this would yield a “cultural 
sociology of secular modernities”:55 all this together will have a scattering 
effect depriving the concepts of secularism and modernity of analytical 
utility.56 This perspective takes every particular, however its boundaries 
may have been defined, to stand for the concept, and to relate it to other 
particulars that are identified by this term, not by concordance under 
the canopy of the concept, but by sheer difference, with a happy union 
appearing as an asymptotic horizon. By collapsing the concept into its 
53 Compare the historiographic multiplication of the Enlightenment in the most perceptive 
analysis of Sheehan, “Enlightenment, Religion and the Enigma of Secularization,” 1066–
69, 1075–76.
54 Al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities, xiii–xiv.
55 Marian Burchardt and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, “Multiple Secularities: Religion and 
Modernity in the Global Age,” International Sociology 28, no. 6 (2013): 605–07.
56 See Sheehan, “Enlightenment, Religion and the Enigma of Secularization,” 1075.
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instances, the effect is that of effacement of the concept, its transposition 
to a realm that is not conceptual, and operates no distinction between 
concept and instantiation. This seems to be the half-intended intention 
in this template which reserves ‘secularism’ for the ideological object of 
polemic rather than addressing practices.
The premise as well as the consequence will be to reduce society and 
history to culture, at the very least to see culture as the overdetermining 
instance in social and historical dynamics. Thus the assumption that one 
cannot see secularisation as occurring “outside culture”,57 whatever the 
metaphor of inside and out might mean or imply, and however culture 
may be defined and identified empirically. Needless to say, the present 
argument is not suggesting that culture understood ethnographically as 
well as historically is of no consequence, or that social representations 
are sheer epiphenomena of structures. What is being suggested is that 
a given society knows no top or bottom; but it does have a hierarchy of 
functions definable in terms of differential impact on the reproduction of 
society or of its transformation. If a certain conjuncture be governed by 
an overdetermination by certain identifiable cultural elements in terms 
of a broader economy of instances – political, social, ideological and so 
forth – this will need to be described concretely, rather than taken for a 
fundamental feature of social life.58
These terms of the discussion perforce carry the semantic energy of 
the terms as used today politically, and gravitate towards a Spenglerian/
Huntingtonian orientation, judging matters in terms of predeterminative 
origins rather than process, in terms of an ethnological destiny, rather 
than by empirical considerations. This applies irrespective of political 
orientation in a conceptual regime where xenophobia and xenophilia 
mirror each other; political distinctiveness here is trumped cognitively 
by conceptual concordance. Scholars partial to multiculturalist practices 
will deny having common ground with conservative or reactionary 
traditionalists and other nativist identitarians. But this denial will stand 
precisely on cognitive decisionism, the effacement of the distinction 
between the ethico-political and the cognitive, and the desire that the 
former be the latter: this effacement is a function of desire, not knowledge. 
57 Burchardt and Wohlrab-Sahr, “Multiple Secularities,” 606.
58 See especially Maurice Godelier, The Mental and the Material, translated by Martin 
Thom (London, Verso, 2011), 128–29.
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It is not often remembered how enthusiastically Huntington was received 
in Iran and Saudi Arabia, and how the idea of a dialogue of civilisations 
rests precisely on assumptions of incommensurable difference.
The terms of reference of the discussions under review have the 
effect of inflecting towards historism and romanticism, the attempt to 
accommodate the undeniable empirical variety which the concept is 
meant to organise, and to cause this variety to drift semantically to the 
multiplicity of sui generis ontologies, cultures and so forth. For quite apart 
from empirical concerns, it seems incontestable that much of the intent 
propelling multiplicationism might be understood in terms of a protocol 
of intercultural courtesy, and as a token of adherence to the celebration 
of diversity and the irreducibility of voices engaged in a conversation – 
a manifest case in point of transposing normative interest into cognitive 
propositions, the ‘ought’ transmuting into an ‘is’. Regarded rhetorically 
and performatively, the very attribute of multiplicity is the performance 
of an ethos, of belonging to a particular politico-cultural place rather 
than another, supporting particular constituencies against others in an 
environment of violent contestation.
Ultimately, we have with multiplication a mincing of words, like saying 
gosh and golly, darn and sugar; we have euphemistic usage,59 a socio-
linguistic phenomenon of evasion and circumvention. Concepts and 
categories, and these include modernity and secularism, are by definition 
general, pertaining to the whole class of phenomena that are bounded 
by them, and cannot, as is sometimes charged, be “monolithic”: they can 
become monolithic only when devoid of conceptual sense and rendered 
into fetishes, like the notion of identity. Concepts deployed comparatively 
cannot be held captive to nominal multiplication, each a multiple sui generis, 
but must rest on generic commonality: comparison indicates an analytical 
grid of variations in which differences and similarities are regarded as 
variations, not as sui generis individuals. Similarities and differences are 
variations rather than signals of the generic specificity of each term of 
comparison when these are taken to be a row of adjacent singularities. 
In conceptual terms, variations indicate particular instances that mediate 
59 On which see especially Emile Benveniste, “Euphémismes anciens et modernes,” 
in Problèmes de linguistique générale (Paris: Gallimard, 1966); Günter Kehrer, 
“Euphemismus,” in Handbuch religionswissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe, ed. Hubert 
Cancik, Burkhard Gladigow and Karl-Heinz Kohl (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1993).
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the general and the individual. Regarded thus, multiplicationism is a 
variant of nativism and identitarianism, multiple nativisms and multiple 
identities. One had better either use a concept in its general sense, or drop 
it. Multiplication collapses concepts into the empirical manifold, rather 
than treating them for the second-order representations which they are.
Another aspect of the polemical effacement of secularism as an 
historical, social and cognitive fact, is the erasure of the word. In many 
recent contexts, the word secularism has been reserved for militant anti-
religious and anti-clerical secularist ideologies of the sort that animated 
the French, Turkish and Mexican states, that is, to the obvious and facile 
object of polemic. Instead, ‘secularity’ has been introduced as a substitute 
for other areas covered by secularism as the condition arising from 
secularisation, for which one would normally and quite straightforwardly 
use ‘secular’ as an attribute: of social arrangements, of legal arrangements 
for the church in a secular order, and much else. Secularity cannot stand 
alone as a substantive. It seems as if things were to be described in terms of 
secularity rather than of secularism, a more adequate description of secular 
arrangements might be reached without naming or designating them as 
secular. This seems to my mind to be an uneconomical and evasive term.
There is clearly in these discussions a fundamental confusion between, 
on the one hand, modernity and secularism as a related pair of analytical 
categories, both incontestable objective processes, and on the other 
hand, normative recognitions, misrecognitions, or denials of these same 
processes, even by many of those undergoing them or participating and 
living in them. Modernity and secularism as objective structural processes 
are in many very significant ways intertwined, globally, their instantiations 
related to each other as members of two intersecting classes of phenomena 
by a process of combined and uneven development. As long as the 
discussion is pitched at the level of normative perception by actors or 
victims, and the actual process described in terms of these representations, 
the chances of a productive discussion are reduced very considerably. 
Such a pitch has become normal, with secularism in India, for instance, 
reduced by one scholar to ‘a credo’,60 ignoring actual social and political 
transformation, or, with reference to the German Democratic Republic 
60 Triloki Nath Madan, “Secularism and the Intellectuals,” Economic and Political Weekly 29, 
no. 18 (1994): 1095.
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defined simply as ‘an interpretative frame’,61 with a similar abatement of 
the sociological gaze which seems little interested in that which is being 
interpreted and by whom. Or again, as with Asad, sweepingly pronounced 
part of a ‘regime of truth’,62 truth being used in a relativistic sense devoid of 
what one would regard as cognitively normative and with no reference to 
any regime of verifiability, thus used indifferently for any sort of opinion, 
however absurd. What is forgotten in this type of conceptualisation is that 
secularism is itself a major actor in the cognitive, normative, and social 
transformation of societies, which together make possible analytical 
concepts that render secularism an object of scientific apprehension and 
elaboration.
Being general by definition, concepts are quite naturally applicable 
outside the immediate circumstances which made their naming, 
delimitation and elaboration possible, and this is pertinent to two concepts 
of relevance to this discussion, secularisation and religion. One is surprised 
that few have had qualms about using the concepts of the economy and 
of society, made possible and developed in Europe in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, outside of Europe, yet declare reserve when the discussion 
pertains to the concepts of secularisation and religion.63 Similarly, one 
finds that Weber is decried as foreign to the phenomena of religion and 
secularism outside Europe, while Foucault or Wittgenstein pass muster 
without comment. In the same vein, one might look at the way in which 
the secularisation thesis is considered in vitalist terms, affirmed in historist 
terms as post-Christian, a sort of “Christianity in sheep’s clothing”,64 and 
denied in other settings, at best relegated to one among many multiple and 
incommensurably sui generis secularities.
Correlatively, the applicability of the notion of religion to Islam is 
denied. Denials of the applicability of the concept, and even of the very 
existence of the phenomenon of religion, are more frequent today than in 
61 Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, Thomas Schmidt-Lux, and Uta Karstein, “Secularization as 
Conflict,” Social Compass 55, no. 2 (2008).
62 Enayat, “Secularism, Christianity and Imperialism,” chap. 2 in Islam and Secularism.
63 For the economy: Louis Dumont, From Mandeville to Marx: The Genesis and Triumph 
of Economic Ideology (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1977); for society: Wolf 
Lepenies, Between Literature and Science: The Rise of Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988).
64 Jonathan Sheehan, “Thomas Hobbes, D.D.: Theology, Orthodoxy, and History,” The 
Journal of Modern History 88, no. 2 (2016): 251.
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the recent past, and the discussion have an air of disputes over the number 
of angels that might stand at the head of a pin. One reason frequently 
invoked is that the concept of religion emerged only in post-Reformation 
Europe. This is a curious and common contention adopted by Asad, curious 
not only because the Islam to which Asad refers and the one he takes to 
be a normative discursive tradition is the one that has been thoroughly 
Protestantised, in the same way as were modern varieties of Hinduism and 
Buddhism, as we shall see, but also of course because the Qur’anic text 
itself has available a clear and distinct notion of religion that corresponds 
to the one that Asad and many others attribute to the Reformation.65
More important than the Qur’an is of course the history of the 
distinction of religion as a domain in political and institutional practices 
that might be termed Islamic, including the notion of siyāsa sharʿīya, 
which is politics and law more religio, much vaunted by fundamentalists.66 
Even if siyāsa, Arabic for politics as the husbandry of humans (and indeed 
for animal husbandry as well), were to be regulated by the strictures of 
Muslim jurisprudence, the analytical difference between worldly politics 
and the concerns of religion, and the distinctiveness of practices in each 
of these domains, was always maintained in Muslim political practices and 
traditions, including the bifurcation of the classical system of justice. This 
distinction, both in theory and in practice, is ubiquitous; it is not confined 
to Islam, nor was it an invention of modernity, of the polemical needs of 
secularism, or of the Reformation. One may cite dharma and artha or 
daṇḍá in classic Indic polities, or the distinction between lokottara and 
laukika, the religious and the worldly, or indeed the concept of agāma as 
religion, in Sri Lanka.67
65 For the Qur’an, a start might be made with Q 5:3, 2:132, 3:19, 85, and see David Marshall, 
God, Muhammad and the Unbelievers (London: Curzon, 1999); for Asad and his Islamic 
discursive traditions, Enayat, “Secularization Theory and its Discontents,” chap. 4 in 
Islam and Secularism; for comment on Asad’s acquaintance with these traditions: Enayat, 
Islam and Secularism, 50. Reference to the Qur’an is pertinent here as it is a text that 
Asad would have been well advised to have read as he wrote about Muslim discursive 
traditions. For broader comment of Asad in relation to what is known from the history 
of religion, ‘Azmī Bishāra, Ad-Dīn wa’l-‘Almāniyya fī Siyāq Tārīkhī, vol 2. (Doha: Arab 
Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2012–2015), 2: 804.
66 Aziz Al-Azmeh, Muslim Kingship: Power and the Sacred in Muslim, Christian and Pagan 
Polities (London, I. B. Tauris, 1997), 118–19, 163–88.
67 Martin Southwold, “Buddhism and the Definition of Religion,” Man, New Series 13, no. 3 
(1978): 263. It being noted that the author is not entirely in agreement with the meaning 
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More generally, a concept need not be native or emic in order for it to 
be applicable analytically to a specific setting. Being exogenous in generic, 
geographical terms is no reason why a concept – such as the economy, or 
religion – should be abandoned. The concept of religion is by no means 
one that was concocted by secularists in the age of the Enlightenment. This 
view is false empirically, on both historical and contemporary evidence. 
Religion, like society and the economy, designates a polythetic class of 
phenomena. Among other places, it was clearly perceptible in 16th-century 
Japan, both by Buddhist priests and Catholic, non-Protestant Christian 
missionaries, where the distinction and interdependence between ōbō/rājā 
dharma and buppō/Buddha dharma,68 occurred in a way reminiscent of 
classical Muslim political works. A recent special number of Japan Review 
dedicated to ‘formations of the secular in Japan,’ was motivated by the claim 
that ‘the secular’ was uniquely Western, and proceeded to produce a series 
of articles based upon both historical and empirical social research that 
showed that the distinction between the secular and the religious (sezoku/
shūkyō) was central to state formation, and that this was just as native to 
Japan, which had not at the time been colonised, as social realities, and not 
only as post-Reformation abstractions, like anywhere else – it seems to be 
an historically preponderant situation. Even Casanova, in an article flirting 
with post-colonial terminology, felt moved to admit that conditions in 
Japan prior to modernity provided evidence for secular arrangements 
independent of Western developments, and ascribed “proto-secularity”, 
somewhat half-heartedly and as if giving way too much to an undeserving 
quarter, to the Chinese imperial state also.69
In all, studies that have just been cited, and other studies based on 
intensive fieldwork seeking to describe and analyse social processes, 
here indicated for agāma. See now Alan Strathern, Unearthly Powers: Religion and Political 
Change in World History (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2019), 71–74
68 See especially Christoph Kleine, “Religion and the Secular in Premodern Japan from the 
Viewpoint of Systems Theory,” Journal of Religion in Japan 2, no. 1 (2013): 1–8, 19–21; 
Brian C. Wilson, “From the Lexical to the Polythetic: A Brief History of the Definition 
of Religion,” in What is Religion? Origins, Definitions, and Explanations, ed. Thomas A. 
Idinopoulos and Brian C. Wilson (Leiden: Brill, 1998). For more general orientation: 
Rodney Needham, “Polythetic Classification: Convergence and Consequences,” Man, 
New Series 10, no. 3 (1975).
69 José Casanova, “Asian Catholicism, Interreligious Colonial Encounters and Dynamics of 
Secularism in Asia,” in The Secular in South, East, and Southeast Asia, ed. Kenneth Dean 
and Peter van der Veer (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 26, 32.
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underline the wealth of the empirical manifold and the variety of 
developments related by both unevenness and systemic connection. Once 
one decides to focus on reality as distinct from polemical representation 
of reality, one can conduct research and cogent ethnographic as well as 
political analysis without needing recourse to the vocabularies of evasion, 
with minimal conceptual distraction or waste of analytical energy.70
In yet another historist and vitalist move, anti-secular polemics have 
generally construed secularism as a movement inside religion (one notes 
that culture and religion are often used interchangeably in this type of 
discourse, especially with regard to Islam). This is in contrast to what 
actually existing secularism has been historically: a constituent element 
in a broader process of societal differentiation in modern global history, 
one to which teleologies attributed to modernisation theory by its critics 
are irrelevant.71 Secularism was a product of the rise of novel institutions, 
social structures of authority, and cognitive facilities and institutions, 
functionally autonomous from religion and its institutions, responding to 
new social needs rather than usurping those hitherto fulfilled by religion 
and its institutions. The contrast between the two was generated as the 
latter sought polemically to resist the expansion of the new. Indeed, 
the conflation of two distinct matters is most common: between the 
sociological concept of functional differentiation, and the normative 
understanding of secularism, the last in turn conflating secularism as an 
objective development and as a political ideology of state.
In all cases, there is in this perspective on things a presumption not only 
of the constitutive primacy of religion, but also a fantasmatic assumption 
of societal homogeneity under the canopy of an order termed Christian. 
Religion appears here as an overdetermining factor, an independent 
variable, which is in actual fact an idea inimical to the spirit of inquiry, 
leaving a blank on the very topic that needs explanation.72 Correlatively, it is 
noteworthy that the grafting of secularism onto the history of Christianity 
70 See the outstanding collection of studies of India, Thailand, Kyrgyzstan, Bahrain, Indonesia 
in: Nils Bubandt and Martjin van Beek, eds., Varieties of Secularism in Asia. Anthropological 
Explorations of Religion, Politics and the Spiritual (London: Routledge, 2012).
71 Among others: Casanova, Public Religions, 18–19; David Yamane, “Secularization on 
Trial: In Defence of a Neosecularization Paradigm,” Journal for the Scientific Study of 
Religion 36, no. 1 (1997); David N. Gellner, “Studying Secularism, Practising Secularism. 
Anthropological Perspectives,” Social Anthropology 9, no. 3 (2001).
72 See Mary Douglas, In the Wilderness: The Doctrine of Defilement in the Book of Numbers 
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has for some time now been very much in vogue, primarily in arguments 
against Islam’s receptivity to secularism. Asad concurs entirely, like the 
vast majority of secularism’s Islamist and post-colonialist critics.73 This is a 
variation on an older trope of denigration directed at the Enlightenment, 
later at Marxism, and now at secularism, when considered as both pseudo-
religious and para-religious movements. This is an old trope, used by 
Herder and de Maistre, persisting most famously with Carl Schmitt, shared 
by Heidegger’s ambivalent acolyte Karl Löwith, and leaving an imprint 
on the Frankfurt School. This trope continued to flourish in Cold War 
polemics that continues to thrive today. It rests on superficial associations, 
including those between psychological states that characterise revolutions 
and messianic stirrings.74
In this historist and vitalist regard, secularisation is seen in a rather 
cavalier manner as the subtraction of religion, curiously with its continued 
existence under another, spuriously secular signature, as Enlightenment or 
Communism. This is lazy thinking, formulaic and effortlessly repeatable. 
Subtraction in these discussions often refers to institutional transformations 
undergone by organs of religion, but such transformation within were slight 
in historical fact, and the locations of secularism have been in new structures. 
Ultimately, the argument is anchored more firmly in the anti-modern figures 
of nostalgia and of the sublime. These two melancholy matters are brought 
together by the notion of secularisation (and modernisation: the two are 
often interchangeable in some discussions) as a form of loss,75 of alienation, 
what Taylor regretted poignantly and eloquently as ‘excarnation’, of ‘buffeted’ 
selves, in the secular ‘wasteland’,76 resulting from immanence that had set 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 51, who finds in this the fundamental weakness 
of Weber’s theory of religion.
73 Asad’s ideas in this respect and in many others are stated with greater explicitness, 
contextualisation and penetration, and sustained by broader reading in Arabic by, for 
instance, the late ex-Marxist cultural Islamist ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Masīrī in ʿAbd al-
Wahhāb al-Masīrī and ʿAzīz Al-ʿAẓma, Al-ʿIlmānīya taḥt al-mijhar (Damascus: Dār al-
Thaqāfa, 1990).
74 Richard Shorten, “The Enlightenment, Communism and Political Religion: Reflections 
on a Misleading Trajectory,” Journal of Political Ideologies 8, no. 1 (2003); Sternhell, “Anti-
Enlightenment of the Cold War;” see Judith Shklar, “The Political Theory of Utopia: 
From Melancholy to Nostalgia,” Daedalus 94, no. 2 (1965): 373, 375.
75 This point is stressed by Blumenberg with regard to modernity: Blumenberg, The 
Legitimacy, 116–20, 533.
76 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 37–42, 
138, 307–21, 448–90, 613–14, 770, 772.
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aside transcendence with its sense of ‘fullness’,77 a usurpation of the authentic, 
a privation of essence, a state of unwholesomeness, a disnature, in counterpart 
to which reaffirmation and, often enough, restoration, including that of an 
Islamic prelapsarian utopia or life taken for an Islamic discursive tradition, 
is the active mystique: all of these poetical terms, reminiscent of classical 
romanticism, and now redolent of the occult, after one had subtracted away 
the pop-psychological considerations and vocabularies one encounters often 
in these types of analyses.78
In the final analysis, the specious character of the subtraction model 
is that it posits a morphological continuity between historical formations 
which does not in fact obtain. The model extrudes all consideration of 
historical breaks and social transformations that came with modernity, 
including the rise of new social, political and cultural forces, institutions, 
dynamics and arrangements to which secularism is related. Modernity is 
the overarching concept in this discussion, and encompasses the novel 
and autonomous emergence of institutional, political and cognitive 
secularism and systemic processes of secularisation.79 The fact is that 
the anachronism of the subtraction thesis is based on a prior, underlying 
analytical premise. This is a prior assertion of the organic and seamless 
relation between secularism and Christianity. This will bring us back 
to historism, culturalism and traditionalism, and their joint rhetorical 
trope, that of the return of religion as to an initial condition of purity 
unadulterated by history, that is, unadulterated and uncomplicated by the 
history of secularism and modernity. The return here figures as a moment 
of awakening and clarity which removes the illusions of change.
There are two volleys to this prior analytical premise of morphological 
continuity. One is broadly historicising in spirit, albeit conducted in the 
form of an historist narrative of essential continuity. This is represented 
by Casanova and Taylor, in two significant books, the former sociological, 
77 See especially the comment of Craig Calhoun, “Review of Taylor, A Secular Age,” in 
European Journal of Sociology 49, no. 3 (2008).
78 This tragic sentimentalism is shared by Wael B. Hallaq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics 
and Modernity’s Moral Predicament (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013).
79 Specifically with regard to the Arab World: Al-Azmeh, Secularism; in shorter compass: 
Gudrun Krämer, “Secularity Contested: Religion, Identity and the Public Order in the 
Arab Middle East,” in Multiple Secularities Beyond the West: Religion and Modernity in the 
Global Age, ed. Marian Burchardt, Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, and Matthias Middell (Berlin: 
De Gruyter, 2015).
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the latter a psycho-conceptual history. The other volley maintains a 
distance from history by a distrust, which is expressed in the name given 
to the undertaking, that is ‘genealogical’, and has a somewhat remote 
claim to anthropology. It is represented here by various widely-quoted 
essays by Talal Asad. Claiming to be an insider’s – ‘emic’ is a common 
term – recasting of the past in light of the present, genealogists compose 
pedigrees, virtual histories of ethos. Taylor’s and Casanova’s are well-
integrated comprehensive studies; Asad’s, in contrast, seems truncated by 
a rather fragmentary acquaintance with the subject, but no less influential 
for being so.
In the spirit of morphological continuity, we are told that secularisation 
is “identified with a particular civilizational trajectory”,80 one which is 
described by Taylor at length with reference to the North Atlantic 
region, to which he adds psycho-historical factors of the embedding and 
disembedding of individuals, in what amounts to a comprehensive attack on 
modernity, reflecting an almost brooding Roman Catholic position.81 
Reference to criticisms of capitalism by Marx, when speaking of fetishism 
of the commodities, of alienation, and of religion, in ways much more 
nuanced and complex than is usually admitted,82 would have enriched and 
nuanced considerably this attitude of discontent and disenchantment with 
civilisation.
Yet for all the high-grade philosophical skills one would expect from 
Taylor, discussion of separate civilisational trajectories is still guided by 
the conflation of historical dynamics with an essentialist ethnology of the 
West. The West is seen to have been grounded essentially in Christian 
traditions, understood monolithically and monocausally, and in a view of 
progress and of the Enlightenment beclouded by distaste and distrust. The 
unstated postulate is that his North Atlantic domains had been ‘societies of 
faith’, a cliché which recent historical research has dented considerably and 
nuanced beyond the proportions that would make this idea serviceable for 
the sort of argument discussed here. But in this type of argument, empirical 
material cannot vitiate the scheme.
80 Taylor, A Secular Age, 36.
81 On which see especially Matthew Rose, “Tayloring Christianity: Charles Taylor is a 
Theologian of the Secular Status Quo,” December 2014, https://www.firstthings.com/
article/2014/12/tayloring-christianity.
82 See Alberto Toscano, “The Clash of Abstractions: Revisiting Marx on Religion,” chap. 5 
in Fanaticism: On the Uses of an Idea (London: Verso, 2010).
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Casanova, some of whose arguments also stand on this silent postulate, 
is enough of a robust sociologist to state that the assumption that pre-
modern Europeans were more religious than today is one “in need of 
confirmation”83 – the same can be said about over-islamising Muslims of 
both today and yesterday. Yet Casanova makes the same sort of conflation 
nevertheless, one that is widely disseminated by the Catholic church, when 
he claims that secularism is the product of a specifically Western modernity, 
specifically Western meaning continuous with its past essentially, and that 
it is therefore “fundamentally and inevitably post-Christian”84. We have 
here a postist location with the discursive effect of extruding history and 
eliminating the weight of systemic and morphological historical breaks 
that came with modernity. I shall come to this particular posture of 
postism in a moment. Casanova, robustly sociological in outlook, insists 
that the multiplication of secularism, like that of modernity, should “open 
the possibility that other religions may also play a role in institutionalizing 
their own patterns of secularization”.85 He thus locates these processes, 
multiplied by the factor of civilisation and tradition in the manner that 
has already been encountered, within religion. The unspoken assumption 
is that religion, presumably taken for a culture in the sense of historist 
culturalism, is the determinant instance in the development of a particular 
historical formation, and is an independent variable.
Casanova claims further that secularism first arose as a Western 
theological category:86 this conveys a close fit with the traditionalist and 
civilisational – culturalist – discourse here proffered, but its meaning is, on 
closer examination, uncertain. I am not aware of secularism as a Christian 
theological category as such. Secularisation as a dispensation for those 
with monastic vows to live outside their cloisters has a place in canon law. 
The secularisation of Church properties by the state is not a theological 
concept. Reference might be made to Augustine’s notion of the two cities 
in support of claiming that secularism be a theological category. But this 
would require a proper argument from Augustine’s theology of history, 
which is only tangentially theological. If such a claim were to be made, 
83 Casanova, Public Religions, 16.
84 José Casanova, “The Secular, Secularizations, Secularism,” in Rethinking Secularism, ed. 
Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan van Antwerpen (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 63.
85 Casanova, Public Religions, 234.
86 Casanova, 61.
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it needs to be properly argued. More generally, it would be helpful if one 
resisted the very common temptation to dub whatever is related to religion 
or the church as ‘theological’. What we are left with is a drift that we can 
see more clearly when we speak of Islam, namely, the drift, presented as 
self-evident common sense, towards identifying past with future, and 
identifying culture, civilisation and religion without stating that one is 
doing so. This is a drift towards rendering religion the defining element of 
culture, of civilisation, of history, and indeed of secularism.
In this way, the idea that secularism, the autonomous institutional, 
social and cognitive line of development in the context of social 
differentiation occurring within and alongside global modernity, might 
involve a common trans-geographical social dynamic, however uneven and 
varied, is made to devolve to an illusion or a conceit, at best to a colonial 
or elitist imposition. There is, with Casanova, and as a clear consequence 
of historism rather than of history, a meta-historical assumption of 
incommensurable historical itineraries, which some call civilisations, 
yielding incommensurable multiple modernities, denominated by him as 
post-Hindu, post-Confucian and post-Muslim.87 Post-Muslim modernity 
in this register would be vulnerable to the argument now commonly taken 
for granted by many, and emerging from the comparable assumptions, that 
Islam – without qualification – is necessarily at odds with modernity, which 
is incompatible with Islam’s “ontological and theological commitments”.88 
This is a specious and often contra-factual type of historical argument 
which is anti-sociological. But it is one that Casanova shares nevertheless 
with very many others – including Hindu and Muslim culturalists of 
various hues, cultural nationalists, fundamentalists and civilisation and 
identity warriors of all stripes.
Patronising multiculturalist impulses to postulate a multiplicity of 
incommensurables in the spirit of a polite conversation aside, there is an 
objective global dynamic that vitiates this vitalist historism and renders 
culturalism and its narratives more like fables eagerly believed than 
verifiable facts. This dynamic is of European origin and impulse, but is 
also one whose cognitive, social and cultural goods were internalised and 
made local everywhere, in a variety of forms and to varying extents. The 
87 Casanova, 64.
88 Michael Alan Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 2008), 292.
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polemics against Eurocentrism are often incoherent in that they use the 
various possible senses of the term interchangeably, often assuming all 
Euro-centred historical analyses to be Eurocentric ideologically. This is 
why ideas about provincialising Europe are so manifestly delusional, for 
Eurocentrism in regarding modern history has solid empirical foundations, 
and is surely more than just an ideological gloss – had it not been so, the 
fuss? There may well be ethical or political motivations for such postures 
of denial, but it is clearly illegitimate to transpose these into imperative 
cognitive and historical propositions, and to correct political asymmetries 
by a cognitive decisionism and appeal to nativism.
4 One Genealogy of Post-colonialist Eminence
The above lines of argument with what appear to be appeals to the 
definitive wisdom and finality of native voice is complemented by the 
positions on Asad in various essays. His is an apology for nativism and 
relativism, despite a “cosmopolitan impulse”,89 not untypical of expatriate 
post-colonialists living in North America.
This apology is grounded in a rhetoric of attachment, investment and 
reverie, consistently transposing what are perceived to be ethical and 
sentimental imperatives to the cognitive domain. Such apology tends to 
veer thereby from the sociology of politics to a sentimentalist and often self-
indulgent psychopolitics of advocacy, with a few sparse footnotes added, 
implying the sort of cognitive decisionism evoked above. It comes from a 
side of the multicultural spectrum, in which disenchantment with Europe 
upon discovering that it is imperfect, slips into a mournful judgment of 
historical invalidation, the ultimate spiritual provincialisation.
Asad’s evident disenchantment is reminiscent of that of the Austro-
Hungarian born Leopold Weiss who, upon conversion to Islam in the 
1920s, took the name Muhammad Asad, in ways that bring up interesting 
commonalities and illustrate well the continuities in anti-modernism 
between its various epochs, here the continuities between the interwar 
period and that in recent decades. A comparison such as this is not as 
vicarious as it may appear, for it illustrates well the retrogressive relations 
89 Enayat, Islam and Secularism, 90.
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between post-colonialist moods of this, post-modernist fin-de-siècle 
and the previous, anti-modernist fin-de-siècle, animated by a sense of 
disenchantment along with a resort to romanticism, espousing organismic 
notions of society and polity. This stood uneasily in relation to a haughty 
discontent with and distaste for what had been regarded by many as a human 
condition inevitably wedded to conditions of vitalism and organism.90
There are fundamental concordances between the views of the two. 
They shared a discontent with what both regarded as the fundamentally 
lasting foundational imprint of Christianity on the contemporary West, 
as Muhammad Asad put it, coexisting paradoxically with the West’s loss 
of “organic coherence of mind”. This diagnosis bears comparison with the 
condition of discontent described by Taylor, with a not too dissimilar profile, 
sharing a set of shared anti-modernist and anti-secular motifs. In contrast, 
Islam offered Muhammad Asad a wholesome option, one that suffered none 
of the alienation and disincarnation of which Taylor spoke. He perceived 
Islam in the Arabian Peninsula of the 1920s, as a total form of life adopted 
by people who had kept their soul together, bound together by a kinship of 
common outlook - a total and organic condition contrasted to diremption, 
alienation and incompleteness. Such sentiments of dissatisfaction – the 
aesthetic, moral, and theological figures sketched by Compagnon – lend 
credibility and allocate primacy, in a mood of contrastive ressentiment, 
to what is perceived as Europe’s utter other. T. Asad was disenchanted by 
Europe and disabused of her in 1967 and 1991.91 One might suggest a temper 
of disenchantment correlated with sympathy for nativism arising from this 
disenchantment, if one wished to ponder and understand support for the 
mob baying for Salman Rushdie’s blood.
T. Asad calls his chosen procedure of understanding “genealogy” 
rather than history, maintaining that one should break with what he 
takes to be the coercive constraints of sociological truth. These are, of 
course, constraints on politico-aesthetic indulgence, and are imperatives 
of socio-historical rationality; they are not a flag-waving celebration of 
abstract reason, but the practice of reason’s analytical capacities. This 
epistemological position, again, bespeaks an attitude congruent with that 
represented a generation earlier by M. Asad, who stated categorically that 
90 See Griffin, Modernism and Fascism.
91 Talal Asad, “Muhammad Asad between Religion and Politics,” Insan ve Toplum Dergisi 1 
(2011): 165.
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Muslim matters cannot be approached with Western concepts or from 
Western historical experiences,92 thereby collapsing cognition into life in 
the manner discussed above. Genealogy according to Foucault, who is 
generally regarded as the alpha and omega of the matter, is a procedure 
that rejects metahistorical deployment of ideal meanings and teleologies, 
and is thus, in principle, opposed to the search for origins. Both authors 
discussed here are after origins perpetually and wholesomely present, 
that is, the abidance of supposed initial conditions as required by the 
overarching essentialism of such vitalist and historist thinking.
Not unexpectedly, T. Asad suggests that one should learn to treat 
Enlightenment assumptions as belonging to “specific kinds of reasoning”, 
and therefore, from the perspective of relativism and of the vitalist, social-
instinct mode of cognition. Assumptions made by turns of mind informed 
by the Enlightenment are not valid grounds from which the understanding 
of the non-Enlightenment traditions must begin -– note the automatic drift 
from actually existing realities, and appeal to traditions. Much concerned 
with the operations of power and ideology in anthropology and in cultural 
translation, what Asad does here is appeal to the notion of Verstehen, 
wielded in such a way as to result in patterning, sympathy and antipathy, 
but little analytical understanding. Witness, for instance, Asad’s disciple, 
one might say his late ethnographer persona, the late Saba Mahmood’s plea 
that hyper-pietist practices by some Egyptian women should be seen as 
technologies of the self.93 The term ‘technologies of the self ’ is not native 
or emic, having been coined by Michel Foucault. But it is nevertheless apt, 
if used in a cursory way to convey pathos, but to deliver little determinate 
sense or analytical understanding. However, despite the pathos it conveys, 
and its association with the empowerment of self-fashioning, the term is 
so abstract as to be inappropriate and misleading. For the hyper-pietist 
conversions of women studied by Mahmoud involve, structurally, the 
reconstitution of selves by means of compliance to norms propagated, not 
always pacifically, by Islamist political organisms, the whole process staged 
in the name of authentic tradition.
92 Muhammad Asad, The Principles of State and Government in Islam (Kuala Lumpur: 
Islamic Book Trust, 1980 [1961]), 18.
93 Saba Mahmood, “Rehearsed Spontaneity and the Conventionality of Ritual: Disciplines 
of ṣalāt,” American Ethnologist 28, no. 4 (2001).
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Translated from the post-colonialist sociolect, which aims to amplify 
sentiment, to social science terminology, which seeks an analytical 
understanding, such conversions would qualify as procedures of re-
socialisation and the inculcation of a habitus by an authority. The 
procedure described is a re-socialisation of such wrenching violence as to 
involve the induction of fear, weeping and elation, to which Mahmood’s 
objects of study (pietist women) admit truly and straightforwardly94 – in 
anthropological terms, it is best described as a dysphoric ritual of initiation 
and rite of passage. The Salafist, pietistic juridification of individual subjects, 
and especially of women, flattens subjectivity and selfhood by reducing 
them to legal instances of compliance. Demystified, this technology of the 
self turns out to have little to do with self-empowerment, construction of 
personal capacity or the exercise of personal freedom, and turns out rather 
to be self-truncation and the excision of the will and self-subjugation. The 
law, and self-fashioning according to the exacting requirements of the law, 
sustains the persona, not the person, for the refashioned subject, now really 
a virtual subject, is deprived of interiority as it wills itself to be reduced to 
legal facts and acts – apt performance driven to the edge of self-parody. In 
broader terms, one might think of the spread of feminine pietism (and its 
male counterpart) historically in terms comparable to the spread of moral 
panic elsewhere, and related to fits of collective hysteria and collective 
fainting reported among adolescent and young adult women in Egypt, 
Palestine and Indonesia in the past two decades. None of this has anything 
to do with the recovery of tradition.
Ultimately, genealogy becomes a speech act of historical reparation for 
wrongs conjectured by the author, and for the reaffirmation of the self, 
both being the advocacy counterpart to apology. In such circumstances, 
the work of the anthropologist is confined to apologetic portrayal weighted 
by a culture held to be sui generis, with analytical discourse, necessarily etic, 
branded as intrusive. What is taken for culture – or tradition or any of its 
associated terms – figures as an all-explanatory inertial energy, ultimately 
94 Mahmood, “Rehearsed Spontaneity and the Conventionality of Ritual,” 839–45. One 
might usefully consult Lamis Al-Solaim and Kate Loewenthal, “Religion and Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder among Young Muslim Women in Saudi Arabia,” Mental Health, 
Religion and Culture 14, no. 2 (2011); and Maja Nedeljkoic et al., “Cultural Issues in 
Understanding and Treating Obsessive Compulsive and Spectrum Disorders,” in Oxford 
Handbook of Obsessive-Complusive and Spectrum Disorders, ed. Gail Steketee (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 496–519, 501–02.
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a cliché, bereft of anthropological analysis and indeed with social and other 
explanatory context missing. This is very much in keeping with what has 
been suggested as being a juxtaposition of raw empirical data and meta-
sociological purpose.
Now for more specific comment, through the byways of Asad’s sinuous 
reservations, nuances and caveats, whose overall economy often escapes 
some of his readers as it beguiles them, or which might be irrelevant to 
those who turn to him for Solomonic guidance. Asad questions the notion 
of the secular and the related notion of religion.95 He proposes that the 
idea of religion is one that is irretrievably manacled to its European 
conditions of emergence, in the way discussed above. Like other concepts 
subject to operational reluctance on the grounds of origin and of nativist 
arguments for cognition, this position is open to criticism as a fallacy of 
partial description, that since concepts may emerge from social activity, 
they are reducible to them – quite apart from the formulaic simplification 
of Foucault’s pronouncements on knowledge and power.
This is a persistent drift in post-modernist and post-colonialist writing, 
where operations of causality are displaced, and the very notion of causality, 
when used at all, is taken in the constructivist manner for the attribution 
of causality only, vaguely Humean but with little of Hume’s subtlety. Thus 
Bruno Latour, for instance, commenting on the death from tuberculosis of 
Ramses II more than 3,000 years ago, as shown by the results of an autopsy 
of his mummified remains. Latour asserted that this Pharaoh could not 
possibly have died of tuberculosis, whose bacillus was not known at the 
time of Ramses’ death, concluding that this attribution of the cause of 
death was anachronistic, retrospective causality, and, as such, illegitimate96 
– let it be noted that the emphasis is on legitimacy, not on cogency or 
validity. Geertz wondered how one would be able to proceed with (in his 
case) anthropological work without needing to assert that anthropology 
is actually possible, given persistent post-colonialist and post-modernist 
anxieties of this kind.97
This endless Pyrrhonism, an ancient form of cognitive filibuster, is one 
eddy flowing into the constructivist view of religion of concern here. It is 
95 On Asad’s views of secularisation overall, see Enayat, “The Body, Pain and Agency,” chap. 
5 in Islam and Secularism.
96 Bruno Latour, “Ramsès II est-il mort de la tuberculose?,” La Recherche 307 (1998): 84–85.
97 Geertz, After the Fact, 128–30.
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incontestable that new religions have been constructed to suit conditions 
emerging from the colonial order and from modern state systems 
emerging from the overthrow of the colonial order. In Bali, for instance, a 
clichéd canonical Hinduism was fashioned suitable for integration into the 
institutes of the Indonesian state. Colonial New Zealand provides another 
instance.98 Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism were also in many crucial respects 
brought into the ambit of modernity according to the global template for 
religion provided by Protestantism.99 But this is something quite distinct 
from an ostensible dead weight of origin rendering the analytical category 
of religion itself irrelevant. As Casanova rightly maintains, to dissolve 
religion and secularism into genealogy and archaeology – another term 
used by Foucault, subsequently used for ethos and pathos – would leave us 
analytically impoverished and without adequate conceptual tools.100 One 
wishes that he himself had resisted this drift with consequent thoroughness.
This is all culturalist solipsism par excellence. Building upon this 
position, Asad proposes a nativist rhetoric of attachment. The Islamic 
religion, he declares solemnly, was the result of a discursive process,101 
apparently without roots in a general historical and anthropological 
category of religion, or in its own complex actual history. An anthropology 
of Islam should begin where Muslims are said to begin, with the discursive 
tradition relating to the Muslim canon, and the practice of what he calls, 
quite aptly, “apt performance” driven by the canon,102 which others, 
wishing to restore its amplitude, might call psychodrama. Islam is not, as 
98 Michel Picard, “What’s in a Name? Agama Hindu Bali in the Making,” in Hinduism in 
Modern Indonesia, ed. Martin Ramstedt (London: Routledge, 2004); Jonathan Z. Smith, 
“The Unknown God: Myth in History,” chap. 5 in Imagining Religion (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982).
99 ‘Azīz ʿAl-Aẓma, “Al-Iṣlāḥīyūn al-nahḍawīyūn wa fikrat al-iṣlāḥ,” Al-Mustaqbal al-‘Arabī 
455 (2017); Reinhard Schulze, “Islam und Judentum im Angesicht der Protestantisierung 
der Religionen im 19. Jahrhundert,” in Judaism, Christianity and Islam in the Course of 
History: Exchange and Conflicts, ed. Lothar Gall and Dietmar Willoweit (Munich: 
Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2011); Richard Gombrich, “Protestant Buddhism,” 
chap. 7 in Theravada Bhuddism: A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1988).
100 Casanova, “A Reply,” 15.
101 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1993), 29.
102 Talal Asad, The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam (Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary 
Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1986), 14–15. Curiously, the discursive traditions 
seem to correspond to what M. Asad would have described as Pharisaic self-righteousness: 
Muhammad Asad, Road to Mecca (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 1980 [1954]), 161, 175.
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Asad maintains rightly, a distinctive social structure. Yet in making this 
assertion, Asad causes sociological and anthropological scrutiny of social 
structure and process appear irrelevant to the anthropologist working in 
this register of essence.
Islam is thus liberated from the social moorings of its practices, and 
becomes mystified as tradition, that is, discourses appealing to a historist 
ideal that give correct form to given practices precisely because they had been 
established by history.103 Asad’s Islam is a mentalist construct with associated 
performances, albeit shod of its status as an anthropological category, yet 
creating the same problems that Asad sees in his criticism of Geertz – it must 
be said, in fairness and contrary to what is asserted, that Geertz does take 
religion for ‘an essence’.104 What is it, one wonders, that impels Asad to describe 
these ostensible traditions which he sees as defining the Muslim religion as 
being “strongly held”,105 without indications of who it is who holds to what 
traditions strongly, and when and under what circumstances, and with what 
sense given to strength here? This kind of impressionistic statement is as 
common in popular journalism as in scholarship. Clearly, what Asad and 
Mahmood describe as the norm are not normal Muslims, whatever these 
may be; they are Muslim beings who are “pre-eminently and determinatively 
religious”,106 in fact, super-Muslims, virtually performed by the scholar. And 
these, consumed by piety or fanaticism or both, clearly do not exist, and 
never did, except as anomalies to the eyes of Muslims themselves, as fringes 
that have recently, however, asserted themselves politically and visually in 
salafi and jihadist groups.
We are back to homeostatic, incommensurable traditions, engaged in 
the polite protocol of recognition (Asad is pessimistic overall) between 
untranslatable registers, expressing themselves in indigenous voices, 
which are ultimately affective, aesthetic, and political choices, unrelated to 
cognitive categories. Native voice is irreducible, and therefore not open to 
analytical reason, resting upon assertion without recall or recourse. Being 
103 Asad, The Idea, 14.
104 Asad, Genealogies of Religion, 115–16; Talal Asad, “Responses,” in Powers of the Secular 
Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors, ed. Charles Hirschkind and David Scott 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 210. See Steven Caton, “What is an 
‘Authorizing Discourse’?,” in Powers, ed. Charles Hirschkind and David Scott (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 45.
105 Asad, Genealogies of Religion, 267.
106 Enayat, Islam and Secularism, 92.
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matters of political, ethical, or traditionalist choice, all voices but the native 
are liable to corrosion, including the voice of scientific reason that expresses 
itself in terms of categories of the social and human sciences, and nothing 
remains admissible but to take discourses on the terms of the research 
object herself. Thus, for instance, Saba Mahmood, building upon Asad’s 
scepticism about the notion of religion, studied networks of feminine piety 
in Egypt minutely and illuminatingly, with its rituals, reflections, habit 
formations and corporeal discipline. As she did so, she insisted with self-
effacing modesty that, rather than conceptualise her material and turn her 
subjects into objects, as a researcher would be required to do, her work 
should lead to parochialising the researcher’s assumptions.107 One always 
welcomes calls to self-reflexivity. But this would need to be a conceptual 
self-reflexivity, rather than an ethical discipline of self-fashioning 
counterposed to cognitive purpose, or a form of contrition, penance and 
confession, reminiscent of the medieval Latin Christianity that had elicited 
Asad’s curiosity some decades before.
Self-patterning clichés, including self-parodic ones, recognised and 
represented but not interpreted, come to have greater salience than 
sociological reason. We are, after all, in the domain of figures of the 
organism. Similarly, in a long discussion of Saudi nasiha, texts of advice 
offered to royal Saudi authorities by younger Wahhabi ‘ulama whose 
conservatism is inflected by political vocabularies derived from standard 
tropes of the Muslim Brother movement, Asad reiterates the point that 
any assumptions of a singular rationality that might be used to judge the 
matter need to be regarded as an imposition. He interprets limitations of 
nasiha materials and attitudes to be due, not to incapacity to countenance 
change, nor to an intrinsic contradiction between reason and religion, 
but to a “particular discursive tradition” and its associated disciplines.108 
Nasiha is therefore not related to clerical or national politics, nor to 
ideologies, social change and inter-generational relations, and is not simply 
repressive and patrimonial. Primarily, Asad believes that it stands on the 
assumption of a moral order of virtuous individuals partly responsible for 
one another’s moral condition,109 a form of peaceable mutual vigilantism. 
107 Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 36.
108 Asad, Genealogies, 232.
109 Asad, 233.
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The interpretation and analysis of the documents discussed are of the same 
order as the document, at best giving voice to what Asad would regard as 
a self-exegetical effort of the document by the document and its authors. 
With neither qualification nor analysis in terms of political and institutional 
anthropology, or thinking about what it might be that empowers one to 
claim the prerogative of a busy-body in a domain deliberately voided of 
politics, Asad’s account seems noticeably unsatisfying. The line between, 
on the one hand, the anthropology of modernity, as Asad calls it, where 
modernity is for once an actual object of analysis, and which is in fact 
an anti-modernist pseudo-historical polemic, and, on the other hand, 
advocacy of tradition, is nowhere apparent.
Asad’s tonalities are noticeably calm, even placid, at once composed 
and quizzical, and tend to convey a discontented and somewhat vexed, 
arguably aggrieved, antipathy to many of the conditions he describes. 
Saba Mahmood was a rather more muscular tribune for her charges than 
Asad, and is almost emblematic of the overdetermination of academic 
practice by the adversarial mood and by a sense of indignation, inculcated 
as an institutional habitus and as a constituent element to the sociolect 
mentioned already. She took this pathway of Asad much further, in a patent 
vindication of obscurantism.110 Speaking, like Asad, against the secular 
notion of religion, which, she claims, is “abstract”,111 whatever this dismissal 
implies or means, she takes to task certain advocates of Muslim reform 
(Abu Zayd, Hanafi, and others) for pleading for the historicity of Qur’anic 
interpretation, on the grounds that this procedure “disenfranchises” 
traditional modes of interpretation.
I will not go into the historical facts of the matter, including who it is in 
fact who disenfranchises whom, and whether what she terms traditional is 
in fact traditional by any proper historical description, and how. Historical 
fact will not be relevant to Mahmood’s argument, which is rounded off 
politically by suggesting that these Muslim reformists were just tailoring 
their work to an imperialist agenda, implying in effect that they worked to an 
agenda set by the CIA: figures “demonised” by Mahmood for undermining 
what she liked to suppose were authentic inherited narratives.112 It seemed 
110 Saba Mahmood, “Secularism, Hermeneutics, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic 
Reformation,” Public Culture 18, no. 2 (2006).
111 Mahmood, “Secularism, Hermeneutics, and Empire,” 324.
112 Ebrahim Moosa and Sher Ali Tareen, “Revival and Reform,” The Princeton Enyclopedia 
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unnecessary to either Asad or Mahmood to check whether what they had 
been told were matters of tradition were in fact any more than very recent 
and group-specific, sub-cultural reconstitutions of the Muslim religion, 
along lines quite precisely analogous to those of exigent Calvinism and 
more radical forms of Protestantism.
The irrationalist doctrine, attendant upon vitalism and discussed 
throughout this essay, is in this case tailored to an apology for contemporary 
identitarian Islamism, and its more traditionalist expressions apparently 
favoured by Asad and Mahmood. This preference worked to elevate this 
inflection of Islam, pars pro toto, to stand for Islam in general, past and 
present. In order to accomplish this, Asad used the very conception of 
religion he decries so much to speak of the Super-Muslims of Europe 
and of their strong attachments to their discursive traditions or, rather, 
to reconstitute them as such. He advocates in effect a political society 
of Stände (Estates), conceived as religious denominations, somewhat 
analogous to a confederation of Millets living in contiguity, but, unlike the 
classical Ottoman system, without relations dominance. This is in effect 
a social model for a polity without politics, a geographical contiguity of 
minorities, informed by a notion of religion and denomination which 
is not only that of the Reformation, but is also Qur’anic.113 For, Asad 
maintains, Muslim immigrants (he still calls them immigrants rather than 
citizens, irrespective of generation), cannot be satisfactorily represented in 
Europe, given Europe’s ostensible ideological construction.114 That they are 
represented as citizens like other citizens, however humanly imperfect the 
system, and without special pleading, seems to be uninteresting.
What is in fact at issue is not representation, which all citizens have, but 
citizenship, which is nowhere addressed. Asad seeks to represent Muslims 
as Muslims,115 that is, as a minority defined not so much sociologically, 
as characterised in the historist mode by historical narratives which still 
remain to be identified, by allegedly embodied memories, feelings and 
of Islamic Political Thought, ed. Gerhard Boewering (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press 2013), 468. See the further comments of Ebrahim Moosa, “Disruptions and 
Reconnections: Re-Discovering and Re-Making Muslim Tradition in Late Modernity,” 
in The Idea of Tradition in Late Modernity, ed. Albert Howard (forthcoming), 88–91.
113 Talal Asad, “Muslims as a ‘Religious Minority’ in Europe,” chap. in Formations of the 
Secular: Christianity, Islam and Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).
114 Asad, 159.
115 Asad, 173.
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desires which he ascribed to them as a group. In this, Muslims are described 
as if they were a homogeneous group,116 to which one needs to add the very 
considerable amount of politically-induced false memories that come into 
the conjuring of memories which are ostensibly shared and alive, but in 
fact virtual. Upon these Muslims, Asad grafts ways of life and practices 
articulated by bookish traditions, which he deems to be “deeply held”: it is 
these, rather than actually existing Muslims, that need political institutions 
to represent them, an image harking back to medieval casts of mind.117
It is manifestly clear that this whole argumentative edifice is geared 
towards traditionalist forms of identitarianism: the deliberate construction 
of minorities, and specifically of Muslim minorities in Europe and 
elsewhere. This is a politics of recognition which operates more with 
categorisation and stereotypification than with apprehension of reality. Its 
implementation calls less for retrieval than for a considerable degree of re-
socialisation according to institutes allegedly traditional but in fact within 
the domain of neo-traditionalist forces of today. This is much like the 
fashioning of pietist women in Egypt. That Asad, with his subtleties and 
caveats, ultimately holds that identity is always made, is only one of many 
ideas that seem lost on some of his more challenged readers. However, this 
is not what, in actual fact, the reader gets cumulatively, the finer points 
of Asad’s judgement being often incompatible with his political advocacy.
What Asad takes for Muslim identity, and what Casanova or Taylor 
take for civilisational paths, are not forces of nature that predestine 
human collectivities to specific outcomes or to restricted horizons of 
possibility. British and Egyptian Muslims cannot summarily be reduced 
to a homogeneous community. Local voice, be it in Riyadh or in London, 
is not a voice of nature. It is a habitus of affectation and contrivance, 
elaborated by apt performance, however ingenuous and seemingly 
spontaneous, and however sincerely performed or meretriciously self-
parodic. In both Jakarta and Cairo, what is regarded as local Muslim 
voice is the result of a recent historical development deploying much 
political and social engineering. Asad never extended his line of thought 
to propose that his own advocacy of tradition might be apt performance 
of anti-modern ideology. One interesting thing here is that with the use of 
apt performance as an interpretative device, Asad is conceiving religious 
116 Asad, 174.
117 Asad, 178.
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practice as a psychodrama, which is really a view of religion which is not 
only particularly marked by the Reformation, but is equally marked by 
the re-socialising modes of politico-religious activism associated with the 
Muslim Brothers.
So too are social and cultural Islamisation, and salafication in 
the Arab World in recent decades. With exceptions, these are not in 
substantive continuity with the past, and this applies most specifically to 
fundamentalism and stringent pietism or social salafication. Identity, it 
must be stressed, is less an indicative concept than a performative one,118 
and hence a contextual political designation. In the context discussed here, 
and to return to the discussion of modernisation and social differentiation, 
the identitarian conception of Islam as a total socio-political and ethical 
superstructure corresponding to the nature of society makes perfect sense. It 
is, after all, the secularisation thesis, with its stress on social differentiation, 
that is able to account for the emergence of religion as an independent 
instance which then comes to make total claims on representing society. 
Secularism is not a phenomenon that defines the relation between Islam 
and the West or that can be defined by this relation; it is in actual fact a 
struggle within Muslim majority countries themselves.
118 Aziz Al-Azmeh, “Identity in the Arab World,” in Keywords: Identity, ed. Nadia Tazi (New 
York, NY: The Other Press, 2004).
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